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Medicaid as Coverture
Thomas E. Simmons*
I. INTRODUCTION
Not long ago, married women possessed limited rights to own separate
property or contract independently of their husbands.1 Beginning in the
nineteenth century, most of the most serious legal impediments to women
enjoying ownership rights in property and freedom of contract were
removed.2 Married women could thereafter own, encumber, transfer and
enjoy property without first seeking their husband’s approval or consent.3
*Thomas E. Simmons is an assistant professor at the University of South Dakota
School of Law as well as a proud graduate of the same institution where he teaches Trusts
and Wills, Estate Planning, Elder Law, Business Organizations, and Property. He serves as
the faculty advisor to the South Dakota Law Review. He is a fellow with the American
College of Trust and Estate Counsel (ACTEC), a member of the editorial board of the
NAELA (the National Association of Elder Law Attorneys) Journal, serving as CoExecutive Editor, and a member of the South Dakota Governor’s Task Force on Trust
Administration Review and Reform. Prior to joining the faculty of the USD law school,
Thomas practiced in the areas of elder law and estates for thirteen years with the Gunderson,
Palmer, Nelson & Ashmore law firm in Rapid City and clerked for two years under Andrew
W. Bogue, senior federal district court judge for the Western District of South Dakota.
1. See Deborah L. Threedy, Feminists & Contract Doctrine, 32 IND. L. REV. 1247, 1253
(1999) (explaining that “[f]or most of the last century married women were not legally
competent to make contracts in their own name.”); see also Cobine v. St. John, 12 How. Pr.
333, 333 (N.Y. Supp. 1856) (holding that “[m]arried women are not personally liable for the
payment of debts contracted by them”) (emphasis in original); see Blood v. Humphrey, 17
Barb. 660, 661 (N.Y. Supp. 1854) (observing that prior to New York legislation in 1848, a
married woman could neither own nor convey realty). Only where a woman’s husband “has
abjured the realm or is banished” would she be capable of “the privilege to contract, sue and
be sued, on her own behalf” although a local custom existed in London where married
women might carry on a trade and thereby sue and be sued as if she were unmarried. JAMES
SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HUSBAND AND WIFE 120 (1882).
2. See generally, Ann Laquer Estin, Marriage and Belonging, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1690,
1692 (2002) (noting that “[b]etween 1820 and 1860, state legislatures began . . . revising the
system of coverture through married women’s property acts”). See infra note 33 for a
definition of coverture.
3. See Linda J. Kirk, Exclusion to Emancipation: A Comparative Analysis of Women’s
Citizenship in Australia and the United States 1869–1921, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 725, 729
(1995). Kirk notes that between 1839 and 1869, 29 jurisdictions enacted Married Women’s
Property Acts “which typically granted married women certain powers to make contracts,
hold and convey property, and retain their separate earnings.” Id.; see also, generally,
Richard H. Chused, Married Women’s Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359 (1983)
(examining the development of Married Women’s Property Acts); Yvette Joy Liebesman,
No Guarantees: Lessons From the Property Rights Gained and Lost by Married Women in
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Married women could enter into agreements and incur debts and
obligations separate from their husbands.4 If the wife defaulted on an
agreement, recovery could be had from her separate property but not her
husband’s separate property (and vice versa).5
Securing property rights for women, however, was an incomplete
achievement in view of the biased workings of the law of divorce and
inheritance, which often undervalued women’s contributions to marital
wealth and underestimated the economic rights of widows and divorced
women. Reforms next targeted alimony and equitable property division
awards in divorce and elective rights upon a spouse’s death.6 At-divorce
property rights were gradually revised over time to reflect the partnership
theory of marriage—the idea that increases in marital wealth over time
were typically due to the efforts and contributions of both spouses, even if
one spouse’s (typically the wife’s) contributions were largely
Two American Colonies, 27 WOMEN’S RIGHTS L. REP. 181, 197–199 (2006) (tracing the
evolution of the right of married women to contract and control their own earnings in
Pennsylvania and New York). In the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court described
the Married Women’s Property Acts as follows:
In pursuance of a more liberal policy in favor of the wife, statutes have been
passed in many of the states looking to the relief of a married woman from
the disabilities imposed upon her as a feme covert by the common law.
Under these laws she has been empowered to control and dispose of her own
property free from the constraint of the husband, in many instances to carry
on trade and business, and to deal with third persons as though she were a
single woman. The wife has further been enabled by the passage of such
statutes to sue for trespass upon her rights in property, and to protect the
security of her person against the wrongs and assaults of other.
Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 615 (1910).
4. Kirk, supra note 3, at 729.
5. E.g., Note, Husband and Wife—Liability of Husband for Wife’s Torts—Effect of
Married Women’s Property Acts, 27 YALE L.J. 564 (1918) (discussing the evolution of the
idea of separate liability for separate torts of husband and wife derived from the Married
Women’s Property Acts). Moreover, married women could sue and be sued in their names.
Wayne F. Foster, Annot., Modern Status of Interspousal Tort Immunity in Personal Injury
and Wrongful Death Actions § 2(a), 92 A.L.R.3d 901, 906–907 (1979). Compare Taylor v.
Hustead & Tucker, 257 S.W. 232, 233 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1924). “At common law a
married woman could not sue or be sued, unless the husband was an alien or was regarded
as civilly dead.” Id. The right of women to sue their spouses was slower to evolve. Foster,
supra, at 907–10.
6. David H. Relsey & Patrick P. Fry, The Relationship Between Permanent and
Rehabilitative Alimony, 4 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 1, 2–7 (1988) (describing the
evolution of alimony through the twentieth century). The first state to authorize an award of
alimony was Massachusetts with legislation introduced by John Adams. Charles P.
Kindregan, Jr., Reforming Alimony: Massachusetts Reconsiders Postdivorce Spousal
Support, 46 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 13, 13 (2013). The second-to-last state to authorize alimony
was Pennsylvania in 1980. Relsey & Fry, supra, at 3. Texas still does not. Id. See also
Martha Minow, Forming Underneath Everything That Grows: Toward a History of Family
Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 819, 831 (1985) (emphasizing the removal of prohibitions against
women serving on juries in the twentieth century); Liebesman, supra note 3, at 182 (briefly
tracing the evolution of women’s suffrage beginning with Wyoming in 1870).
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noneconomic.7 Later, attention turned to women’s income rights, and
advocacy for equal pay in the workplace.8
Spousal inheritance rights underwent similar changes during the
twentieth century, responding to calls for greater protections for married
women following the death of their husbands.9 These rights took form in
two primary arenas: intestacy rights and elective share rights. Intestacy
rights provided for the right of a spouse to inherit from a deceased spouse’s
estate in the absence of a valid will.10 Elective (or forced) share rights
provided for the right of a surviving spouse to claim a statutory minimum
amount of property from a deceased spouse’s estate where the decedent’s
will disinherited or partially disinherited the survivor. Under the Uniform
Probate Code, for example, a surviving spouse has the right to claim a
forced share against her late husband’s will based on a sliding scale
according to the length of the marriage.11 While reforms are arguably still
necessary to fully achieve equal property rights for women, the
transformation of women’s property rights over the last two hundred and
fifty years has certainly been both dramatic and meaningful.

7. BARTH H. GOLDBERG, VALUATION OF DIVORCE ASSETS § 10.4 (rev. ed. 2014)
(considering cases which weigh both the economic and noneconomic contributions to a
marriage in the context of divorce). See also MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF FAMILY LAW 86 (1989) (asserting that the partnership theory of marriage “closely
approximates the expectations of most people who enter marriage”).
8. E,g., Equal Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 5, 75 Stat. 67, June 10, 1963 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 206(d) (1998)).
9. See Terry L. Turnipseed, Why Shouldn’t I Be Allowed to Leave my Property to
Whomever I Choose at my Death? (Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Loving
the French), 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 737, 738–40 (2006) (describing the evolution of the elective
share from its dower and curtsey origins).
10. E.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102(1) (amended 2010) (providing that a surviving
spouse is entitled to all of decedent spouse’s intestate estate if the decedent had no surviving
descendants or parents or if “all of the decedent’s surviving descendants are also
descendants of the surviving spouse and there is no other descendant of the surviving spouse
who survives the decedent”). Intestacy rights for surviving spouses have increased over the
last century or two from one-third to all of the decedent spouse’s estate assuming no
separate descendants of the decedent also survived. Susan N. Gary, The Probate Definition
of Family: A Proposal for Guided Protection in Intestacy, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 787,
792–93 (2002).
11. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-202, 2-203. The forced share amount increases for the
first fifteen years of marriage, reaching its maximum amount at the couple’s fifteenth
anniversary. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-203. The maximum claim is essentially one-half of
the joint marital net worth, including transfers by the decedent to others within two years of
death. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-205(3)(C). The pre-1990 Uniform Probate Code
provisions gave a surviving spouse a one-third claim, “largely a carry over [sic] from
common-law dower, under which a surviving widow had a one-third interest for life in her
deceased husband’s land.” UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 cmt. In most jurisdictions today,
“the surviving spouse is allowed to elect one-third of the decedent-spouse’s property if the
decedent had surviving issue or one-half if there are no surviving issue.” Turnipseed, supra
note 9, at 793. Most jurisdictions also do not vary the elective share right based on the
length of the marriage. Id.
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Three twenty-first century developments, however, diminish some of
this progress. First, later-in-life (typically second) marriages have become
more common.12 In a typical later-in-life marriage, both spouses may be
retired or near retirement age, and hence often switch from an incomegenerating and wealth-accumulation mode to either a wealth-preservation
or a gradual wealth-consumption phase in life.13 Living on a fixed income,
couples in a later-in-life marriage do not typically contribute to the
accumulation of marital wealth. They only, to a greater or lesser degree,
contribute to the depletion of marital wealth.14 Moreover, many
contemporary later-in-life couples reject traditional mores and values when
it comes to their views of the partnership theory of marriage, choosing to
keep their financial affairs separate and distinct from one another.15 These
types of couples were not the spouses that reformers had in mind in
designing inheritance rights or other property rights arising out of the
marital relationship.
Second, perhaps as a product of advocacy for women’s property rights,
and perhaps out of a larger social remodeling, women’s holdings of wealth
have made significant advances.16 In the twenty-first century, more and
more later-in-life marriages are comprised of spouses of equal wealth, or of
a less-propertied husband and a wife with greater net worth.17 Genderneutral forced-share rights can result in a windfall for a surviving spouse in
12. Willard H. DaSilva & Steven J. Eisman, Gray Divorce and Remarriage, 83 N.Y.
ST. B.J. 26, 26 (2011).
13. James Poterba, Steven Venti, & David Wise, The Composition and Drawdown of
Wealth in Retirement, 25 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 95, 95 (2011) (noting that as individuals
“enter their retirement years, the accumulation phase of their life-cycle is nearly over”
and the focus shifts “from the accumulation of resources while working to the drawdown
of resources”).
14. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 55 (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.uni
formlaws.org/shared/docs/probate%20code/upcamends_final_08.pdf (acknowledging the
difficulty in applying the partnership theory of marriage to a “later-in-life marriage
(typically a post-widowhood remarriage) in which neither spouse contributed much, if
anything, to the acquisition of the other’s wealth”).
15. See DaSilva & Eisman, supra note 12, at 27 (noting that “[w]hen a marriage occurs
later in life, each partner has his or her own life-long experience which raises distinct
issues” and each “has assets and liabilities, developed separately from the new marital
partner” with “a family (children, grandchildren and others) separate from the new marital
partner.”); see also LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: SPOUSES, LOVERS,
AND THE LAW 365 (1981) (noting that many older persons “are much more likely than the
young to explicitly reject marriage and to choose living together as a reasonable and
satisfying alternative”).
16. Richard H. Chused, History’s Double Edge: A Comment on Modernization of Marital
Status Law, 82 GEO. L.J. 2213, 2220 (1994).
17. Recent data, for example, shows male householders age sixty-five and older with a median
net worth of $130,000 and female householders age sixty-five and older with a median net worth
of $104,000. United States Census Bureau, Median Value of Assets for Households, by Type of
Asset Owned and Selected Characteristics: 2011, available at http://www.census.gov/
people/wealth/files/Wealth_Tables_2011.xlsx (last visited Apr. 2, 2015).
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certain circumstances.18 Legal reforms like forced-share rights were
originally designed to protect women as the typically less-propertied
spouse of a more assertive and socially empowered husband who
controlled the familial wealth. But when the wife has greater wealth than
her surviving husband, the forced share offsets wealth gains by women.
Forced-share rights are especially difficult to justify in a later-in-life
marriage devoid of jointly accumulated wealth. Women of some wealth (in
later-in-life marriages, especially) may in fact find themselves penalized by
the very gender-neutral reforms that were designed to help them;19
especially, as will be unpacked and amplified below, when those reforms
interface with Medicaid rules.
Third, beginning in the late twentieth century, the possibility of
ongoing custodial care costs became the single greatest threat to financial
security for older Americans.20 Medicare, in most cases, provides a safety
net for unreimbursed medical expenses for older Americans.21 Medicaid,
however, is the only safety net for unreimbursed long term care costs, and,
being strictly a means-tested program, Medicaid only offers relief to
individuals in need of nursing home care once their assets have been
significantly depleted.22 The very real threat of wealth loss to middle class
Americans is rebarbative.
18. See Shari Motro, Labor, Luck and Love: Reconsidering the Sanctity of Separate
Property, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1623, 1644 (2008) (observing that elective share rights may
grant a greater share of property to a disinherited surviving spouse “than they would at
divorce under labor-centered partnership principles.”).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 34–35 for a discussion of same-sex couples in the
Medicaid context. See also De Leon v. Perry, 975 F.Supp.2d 632 (W.D. Tex. 2014)
(considering the impact of denying legal marital recognition to same-sex couples, including,
inter alia, intersection with Medicaid eligibility rules).
20. See Eric S. Kim, Paying for the Long-Term Care of the Elderly: Current Sources of
Payment, Potential Issues, and Proposal for a New Way to Finance Long-Term Care, 22
ANNALS HEALTH L. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 172, 172 (2013) (noting that a 65-year-old
individual has a 35%–50% chance of using long term care service which cost, on average
$72,000 per year). “[T]he costs of long-term care are staggering, and seniors can exhaust
their life savings in a short time while in long-term care.” Gillmore v. Illinois Dept. of
Human Serv., 843 N.E.2d 336, 349 (Ill. 2006).
21. See infra notes 102-10 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of Medicare.
“When Congress created the Medicare program in 1965, its purpose was to provide hospital
and medical insurance for persons over the age of sixty-five. . . .” Dean M. Harris, Beyond
Beneficiaries: Using the Medicare Program to Accomplish Broader Public Goals, 60
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1251, 1252 (2003).
22. See infra notes 111–14 and accompanying text for an introduction to the Medicaid
program in the long-term care context.
Medicaid is a health insurance program for the poor. It is administered by
the states and funded by both the federal government and the states. The
purpose of Medicaid is to provide adequate medical assistance and
rehabilitative services to individuals who are unable to afford sufficient care
on their own.
Marlaina S. Freisthler, Comment, Unfettered Discretion: Is Gonzaga University v. Doe A
Constructive End to Enforcement of Medicaid Provider Reimbursement Provisions?, 71 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1397, 1397 (2003).
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These three trends—later-in-life marriages, women with greater wealth
than their husbands, and the destructive force of nursing home costs—
frequently coalesce in real world situations. Women of equal or greater
wealth than their male partners in later-in-life marriages commonly endure
significant and troubling depletions of their separate wealth when their
husbands require long-term care. The three following case studies are
designed to introduce and frame a discussion of these issues. Married
women of average means in second marriages often encounter these legal
doctrines in quick succession, all of which either advance the erosion of the
woman’s wealth or serve as very imperfect protective mechanisms. The case
studies are typical examples of recurring events in many women’s lives.23
The following discussion builds on these three case studies in a clientcentric way. Often, marriage provides women and men with more costs than
benefits at least insofar as property rights are concerned. The legal benefits
to marriage—estate, gift and income tax advantages and child
custody/adoption rights—are of limited utility to older individuals of average
means.24 The legal downsides—loss of estate planning flexibility and
support obligations—represent serious concerns.25 The expectations of
women entering marriage later in life may be radically different from the
one-size-fits-all bundle of legal rights and obligations that the law delivers.26
In this article, after an abbreviated overview of the evolution of married
women’s property rights that is designed to place an analysis of Medicaid’s
treatment of marital wealth in its historical context, the three case studies are
introduced. The hypothetical case studies are intended to provide a
framework for analysis in much the same way that individuals would
23. Although no case study is based on any actual clients of your author, they are all
composites based on hypothetical real life events which very likely recur on a common basis
for many individuals.
24. See 26 U.S.C. § 2001(c) (2011) (providing a $5 million exemption, indexed for
inflation, against federal estate and gift taxes); 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (2011) (providing for a
marital deduction against federal estate and gift taxes). The marital deduction against federal
estate and gift taxes is only useful for individuals otherwise subject to the estate and gift tax
and since the exemption is in excess of $5 million, the benefit to marriage in the federal estate
and gift tax context is nonexistent for individuals of average means. Despite the so-called
“marriage penalty,” there are federal income tax planning opportunities available to unmarried
individuals which are unavailable to married couples. See generally, Theodore P. Seto, The
Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay Marriage, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1529 (2008). For
retired couples on fixed incomes and little or no income tax liability, however, any income tax
advantages associated with marriage are comparatively insignificant.
25. See 41 AM. JUR. 2d Husband and Wife § 163 (2014) (outlining spouse’s liabilities for
necessaries furnished to other spouse).
26. See Clifton B. Kruse, Jr., Love May Be Less Wonderful the Second Time Around
(Medicaid Considerations When Well-to-Do, Healthy Clients Remarry And Their Late-inLife Companions Are Less Well-to-Do), 13 NAELA Q. 11, 11 (2000) (“Our clients are told
that for Medicaid benefit purposes, they and their spouses are one—something that the
clergyman may have reminded them of when they each pledged their troth to the other” and
as they voice “their vows, they became—in the eyes of the king—a single economic unit.”).
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encounter the rules of Medicaid eligibility in the real world. Following the
case studies is an introduction to Medicaid eligibility rules including resource
tests and gifting penalties. The explication of Medicaid rules then narrows to
how Medicaid eligibility rules view spousal income, spousal wealth, and
gifts (including gifts made by one spouse with or without the knowledge or
consent of the other spouse) and demonstrates Medicaid’s embrace and
reembodiment of medieval coverture in a contemporary context.
Some readers may object to the recurring tragedies suffered by the
women of these case studies. After all, it is true enough that a well-drafted
premarital agreement, a zealous divorce attorney, or a deftly executed
Medicaid strategy may ameliorate some of the harsher results.
Additionally, adequate levels of long-term care insurance can either greatly
diminish or even eliminate the wealth loss that accompanies long term care
expenses.27 Therefore, perhaps the lessons to be taken from these
discussions are to be found in greater advocacy and pre-planning for longterm care.28 More significantly, emphasis should be placed on counseling
individuals considering marriage of the financial costs—especially the
exposure to wealth loss on account of the other spouse’s long term care
needs—that accompany the legal status of matrimony.29

27. See Robert R. Pohls, Long Term Care Insurance, 32 BRIEF 28 (2002).
28. For example, in the case study of Wanda and Hagar, the impact of Medicaid estate
recovery might have been mitigated by certain techniques. See infra, p. 293. See Marvin
Rachlin, What Is a Spouse’s Liability for Medicaid Benefits Paid?, ESTATE PLANNING 119–
20 (Mar. 2003) (suggesting the use of inter vivos gifts following the death of the community
spouse); but see In re Estate of Bergman, 688 N.W.2d 187, 191–92 (N.D. 2004) (allowing
state Medicaid agency to void gifts by surviving community spouse). In the case study of
Wendy and Herbie, the “forced forced share” scenario might have been avoided by an
agreement between the spouses mutually waiving their rights to an elective share from the
other’s estate. See Linda S. Ershow-Levenberg, Elder Law Planning for Older Couples in
Second Marriages, ASPATORE, 2011 WL 959528 * 4 (Mar. 2011); but see infra note 158 for
cases holding that disclaimers of inheritance rights constitute disqualifying transfers. In the
case of Gail and Lucy, perhaps a spousal refusal technique could have mitigated Lucy’s
exposure for Gail’s long-term care costs. See Andrew D. Wone, Don’t Want to Pay for
Your Institutionalized Spouse? The Role of Spousal Refusal and Medicaid Funding in LongTerm Care, 14 ELDER L.J. 485 (2006); but see In re Shah, 733 N.E.2d 1093, 1095 (N.Y.
2000) (noting that New Jersey does not recognize spousal refusal).
29. See Kruse, supra note 26, at 13 (writing, concerning marriage for older couples, “[i]t
is about this subject that our clients must be warned. They must be informed of a
presence—a shadowy apparition who will attend their wedding ceremonies. The unseen
government interest will hear the elders’ vows: the promises not only to cherish, but to care
in sickness and in health—translate that as “for full costs of care”—at least when sickness
overcomes the unmonied one—until death, in fact, does part them, and the public policy
responsibility of the spouse for this cost may finally cease.”).
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This article steers neatly around considerations of community property.30
Community property’s historical evolution differs markedly from the
trajectory in separate property states, though both share a common concern
with the less propertied and noneconomic contributor to the marital team,
and both elevate the partnership theory of marriage when it comes to
property rights.31 For sake of clarity and brevity, however, the discussion
omits any analysis of community property. The discussion similarly avoids
undertaking anything approaching a comprehensive survey of state law
variations either in the context of Medicaid eligibility rules or those marital
property rights that impact Medicaid eligibility determinations.
This author’s aim is to demonstrate recurring confrontations between
the financial expectations of women encountering long term care needs of a
spouse in a later-in-life marriage and the framework of Medicaid eligibility.
The Medicaid rules give no acknowledgement of, nor deference to, the
typical expectations of women in later-in-life marriage and often result in
significant wealth erosion before the cared-for spouse dies, recovers, or
Medicaid eligibility is finally achieved. Even upon achieving Medicaid
eligibility, Medicaid’s estate recovery program may further impede the
ability of the woman to effectively exercise her property rights at death. To
be sure, men in later-in-life marriages may very well encounter similar
surprises that contradict his and his partner’s intent to share a household
but not their separate property (or with one another’s heirs and creditors).
Medicaid eligibility rules and underlying state law marital property rights
often contradict the expectations of either spouse.

30. Briefly, it can be noted that community property—recognized in Arizona, California,
Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and Alaska—is
real or personal property acquired through effort or labor by one or both spouses while
domiciled in a community property state. ROBERT L. MENNELL & THOMAS M. BOYKOFF,
COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN A NUTSHELL 1–4 (2nd ed. 1988). Alaska recognized the ability of
its residents to elect community property treatment in 1998. ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.77.010, et
seq. (2014). A number of variations exist among those states recognizing community
property; “[t]here is no single community property system.” MENNELL & BOYKOFF, supra,
at 8. “Community property systems treat each item of property which either member of the
couple acquired while married and domiciled in a community property state as acquired by
them as equal owners of one half each.” Id. at 5. This treatment has important tax, creditor,
management, and inheritance implications. Id. Community property also recognizes the
distinct legal existence of each spouse, ignoring the dissolution of all property rights of the
wife in favor of the husband: “Community property . . . is wholly repugnant and inimical to
the common law because of its elevation of the wife to a position of equality with the
husband.” William A. Reppy, Jr. and Cynthia A. Samuel, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE
UNITED STATES 9 (7th ed. 2009) (reprinting sections of Michael Vaughn, The Policy of
Community Property and Inter-Spousal Transactions, 19 BAYLOR L. REV. 20 (1967)).
31. E.g., J. Thomas Oldham, Separate Property Businesses That Increase in Value
During Marriage, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 585, 585–86 (1990) (explaining that with community
property, “[t]he partnership is perceived to encompass all property generated during
marriage by the efforts of either spouse.”).
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Yet for women, in this author’s thirteen years’ experience in private
practice, confronting the legal mechanisms which accompany the pursuit of
Medicaid benefits for an ailing spouse’s long term care needs is more
astonishing than it typically is for men in the same circumstances. To risk
what modest wealth the woman has accumulated, on account of a spouse’s
costly care needs, seems especially antipodal to the themes of elevating
women’s property rights. Perhaps ironically, at least some of the inflexible
legal mechanisms in play (elective share rights in particular) are the very
rules that were supposed to have helped preserve the financial independence
of women.32 At the same time, Medicaid eligibility determinations reinstate
the archaic notions of coverture, ignoring the separate property rights of
spouses and treating the marriage union as a unity.33
Same-sex marital couples should also be considered. Spouses in samesex marriages can certainly encounter the same Medicaid axioms that run
counter to the expectations of those hoping to delineate separate spheres of
existence and responsibility when it comes to property and debt in a marital
relationship. Many same-sex couples seem ready to plunge headlong into
marriage, citing the numerous and plentiful rights which naturally flow
from the institution such as social security benefits, health insurance
eligibility, federal estate and gift tax advantages, and parenting rights.34
Those who are critical of the same-sex community’s embrace of the
institution of marriage may question whether equality can be achieved
through mimicry of non-queer institutions, but they fail to acknowledge the
32. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage: Divorce or Death, 2005
UTAH L. REV. 1227, 1244 (2005) (noting that “inheritance rights benefit spouses only, yet
they also constrain spouses’ ability to act independently.”).
33. Coverture is an archaic legal term describing the legal condition of a woman being
married. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 446 (10th ed. 2014).
Coverture, is a french word signifying any thing that covereth, as apparell, a
coverlet . . . It is particularly applied in our common lawe, to the estate and
condition of a maried woman, who by the lawes of our realme, is in
(potestate viri) and therefore disabled to contract with any, to the preiudice
of her selfe or her husband, without his consent and privity; or at the least,
without his allowance and confirmation.
Id. (quoting John Cowell, THE INTERPRETER (1607)).
34. KATHLEEN E. HULL, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF LOVE AND
LAW 117–23 (2006). Hull lists many legal benefits to marriage without acknowledging the
significant financial risk of becoming legally liable for one’s partner’s support. Id.
“Marriage is a legal state conferring real, tangible benefits on those who participate in it:
specifically, tax breaks as well as other advantages when it comes to inheritance, property
ownership, and employment benefits.” Sam Schulman, Gay Marriage—and Marriage in
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 230 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E.
Rosenbaum, eds., 2nd ed. 2004); but see DENIS CLIFFORD, HAGARERICK HERTZ & EMILY
DOSKOW, A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN & GAY COUPLES 55–56 (16th ed. 2012) (cautioning
under the heading “Is Marriage (or Its Equivalent) Right for You?” that “[m]arrying may
cause you or your partner to lose state-provided benefits, because your partner’s income will
be counted along with yours” but misleadingly suggesting that marriage results in joint
liability for all debts).
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potential loss of property rights and financial independence that necessarily
accompany wedding vows.35 Both same-sex and different-sex couples on
the cusp of marrying should consider the same cautions insofar as the legal
negatives—especially with regards to the possibility of one spouse’s long
term care needs—before walking down the aisle.
Indeed, on a broad scale, the gap between what the law grants to
married couples with default or non-waivable rights and obligations, and
what couples of all varieties reasonably expect and desire, may be
widening.36 Society and culture have evolved significantly since the days
when horses were the primary mode of transportation, yet the law,
relatively speaking, has changed little.37 The aim of this article is not so
much to criticize the Medicaid eligibility rules, which were designed to
delineate a narrow class of financially needy persons for a means-tested
government program, but to highlight how the implementation of those
rules, sometimes surprisingly, work an erosion of a woman’s property
rights when her spouse encounters a decline in health which necessitates a
lengthy stay in a long term care facility. The legal assumptions
accompanying this kind of wealth erosion mimic the same kinds of
eighteenth and early nineteenth century attitudes towards women’s
property rights that many assume can only be found in the history books.

II. DISCUSSION
A. DOWER, WOMEN’S PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND COVERTURE
William Blackstone’s Commentaries, written in the mid-eighteenth
century, explained that while a single woman could hold goods and chattels
in her own name, upon marriage her legal existence merged with that of her

35. See, e.g., Suzanne A. Kim, Skeptical Marriage Equality, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 37,
37–38 (2011) (questioning “how we can be skeptical of marriage a legal category and of its
privileged status in law and society, but also favor marriage equality for same-sex couples”);
Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Not Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian
Marriage Will not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage”, 79
VIRGINIA L. REV. 1535, 1536 (1993) (characterizing that for same-sex couples to pursue
marriage mimics “the worst of mainstream society”); Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is
Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN QUARTERLY 6
(Fall 1989) (arguing that marriage undermines the goals of gay liberation).
36. “The composition of the nuclear American family has now evolved from the classic
couple entering into a marital relationship prescribed by state law to a de facto relationship
existing outside the legal rules of marriage.” Justice Harry Lee Anstead, New Jersey
Abolishes the Death Penalty—Is Legal Marriage Next?, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 749, 752
(2008). Households headed by married couples constitute a minority of households. Id.
(citing Sam Roberts, To be Married Means to be Outnumbered, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2006).
37. But see Barbara A. Atwood, Marital Contracts and the Meaning of Marriage, 54
ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 41 (2012) (concluding that “[w]hile some states appear to endorse a
construct of marriage as an immutable status, others are willing to place marital contracts
almost on par with commercial contracts.”).
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husband.38 Chattels formerly owned by the wife immediately vested as the
husband’s “absolute property, devolved to him by the marriage, not only
potentially but in fact, which never can again revert in the wife or her
representative.”39 Blackstone categorized marriage as one of the various
methods by which title to property may be obtained (e.g., by succession, by
forfeiture, by judgment, or by marriage). Upon marriage those chattels
formerly owned by the wife “are by act of law vested in the husband, with
the same degree of property and with the same powers, as the wife, when
sole, had over them.”40 Marriage functioned to transfer property owned by
the wife to the husband by operation of law.
This automatic divestment of the woman’s separate property rested on
the notion of the unity of person between the spouses—that they are one
person in law “so that the very being and existence of the woman is
suspended during the coverture.”41
With the status of marriage, there could be no separate property of the
wife other than limited incidents of ownership associated with separately
owned real property.42 With real property owned by the wife, the husband
gained only “a title to the rents and profits during coverture: for that,
depending upon feudal principles, remains entire to the wife after to the
death of her husband, or to her heirs, if she dies before him; unless, by the
birth of a child, he becomes tenant for life by the curtesy.”43 This was an
estate jure uxoris (or “by the right of the wife”).44 Although the jure uxoris
was essentially only a life estate for the husband’s benefit, the estate was
liable to his debts and he could sell or mortgage his interest in it.45
38. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *433 (hereinafter, BLACKSTONE II).
Spellings from Blackstone’s Commentaries have been modernized by the author.
39. Id. at *435.
40. Id. at *433.
41. Id. Although the wife retained her paraphernalia, “the apparel and ornaments of the wife,
suitable to her rank and degree,” if she survived her husband, the husband nevertheless had the
authority “(if unkindly inclined to exert it)” to transfer or convey them to others. Id. at *436–37.
42. Id. at *433–34. “The common law regarded the husband and wife as one and the
husband as the one.” JOHN E. CRIBBETT & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
PROPERTY 89 (3rd ed. 1989). “At common law, the husband and the wife were but one
person.” GEORGE W. THOMPSON, 4A COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY 48 (1979).
This hierarchical relationship has been maintained by sex differentials in the
age at which boys and girls can marry, by laws and customs dictated that a
married woman assume her husband’s name, by statutes requiring a married
woman to take her husband’s legal domicile as her own, and by rules
establishing the husband’s right to his wife’s services and affections.
WEITZMAN, supra note 15, at 5. See also, e.g., Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D.
Ala. 1971) aff’d, 405 U.S. 970 (1972) (upholding an Alabama driver’s license regulation
requiring married women to use their husband’s surnames along with state law which
required a woman to assume her husband’s surname upon marriage).
43. BLACKSTONE II, supra note 38, at *433.
44. CRIBBETT & JOHNSON, supra note 42, at 89.
45. Id. Upon the husband’s death (or the very unlikely even of divorce as absolute
divorce was not recognized absent a special act of Parliament), the estate jure uxoris became
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Coverture described how the legal status of a married woman merged
with that of her husband.46 The wife became feme covert, incapable of
contracting or carrying out most legal acts.47 Denying women the right to
own property independently of their husbands was based in part on low
opinions of women’s abilities and judgment; women might “run amok if
they could own their own property.”48 Paternalism was also at work.49
Blackstone proudly defended coverture: “[W]e may observe, that even the
disabilities, which the wife lies under, are for the most part intended for her
protection and benefit. So great a favorite is the female sex of the laws of
England.”50 Since women could rarely even earn wages independently of
their husbands, some level of protection was certainly in order.51 Whether
such protection was achieved through coverture is questionable.
It followed from this doctrine of merger that a husband and a wife
could not contract with one another, for “to covenant with her, would be

the wife’s if she survived and no children were born of the marriage, but if children were
born then the estate merged into the husband’s estate by curtsey. Id. The birth of issue
transformed the estate jure uxoris “to curtsey initiate which in turn became curtsey
consummate upon the death of the wife.” Id.
46. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 446 (10th ed. 2014).
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during marriage, or at
least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under the
whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs every thing [sic]; and is
therefore called in our law-french a feme-covert; that said to be a covertbaron, or under the protection and influence of her husband, her baron, or
lord; and her condition during her marriage is called her coverture.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430 (hereinafter, BLACKSTONE I); see also
United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 359 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting) (observing that
“that though the husband and wife are one, the one is the husband”).
47. Rowe v. Kohle, 4 Cal. 285 (Cal. 1854). Feme covert is an archaic French legal term
for married woman or literally “covered woman.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 737 (10th ed.
2014). A feme sole meant an unmarried woman. Id.
48. Margaret Valentine Turano, Jane Austen, Charlotte Bronte, and the Marital Property
Law, 21 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 179, 185 (1998).
49. See CRIBBETT & JOHNSON, supra note 42, at 88 (claiming that marital property
interests “were a kind of social security and they gave some assurance that the spouse of a
man (or woman) would not be left entirely destitute”). Marital property interests were,
Dean Cribbett and Professor Johnson asserted, “created for the protection and use of either
the husband or the wife and it is more realistic to look at them in this light.” Id.
50. BLACKSTONE I, supra note 46, at *445.
51. E.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 139 (1873) (upholding an Illinois state court
decision denying a married woman the right to practice law). “The natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the
occupations of civil life.” Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). See also John Fabian Witt,
From Loss of Services to Loss of Support: The Wrongful Death Statutes, the Origins of
Modern Tort Law, and the Making of the Nineteenth-Century Family, 25 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 717, 738–39 (2000) (emphasizing that even if women did earn wages “until the
enactment of married women’s earning statutes, married women’s earnings belonged to
their husbands.”).
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only to covenant with himself.”52 In fact, the wife was deemed unable to
contract at all during marriage.53 The husband became automatically liable
for any pre-marriage debts of his wife, as well as for necessaries that she
consumed during the marriage.54 Attempts by the woman to execute a deed
to realty were “void, or at least voidable” (unless the conveyance related to
something like a fine).55 A married woman’s testamentary freedom was
almost nonexistent.56 The legal condition of a married woman was
certainly impaired in Blackstone’s day, though the doctrine of merger was
not without limits. The husband was not liable for debts incurred by his
wife during marriage “for any thing [sic] besides necessaries.”57 Although
52. People ex rel. Lee v. Lee, 157 N.Y.S. 821 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1916) (quoting these words of
Blackstone which were reprinted in an earlier 1842 decision but also noting that “the world has
moved since 1842”). Nor could a husband convey any property to his wife since it would be
as conveying property to himself. BLACKSTONE I, supra note 46, at *430. He could, however,
bequeath her property upon his death since death ended the coverture. Id. Echoes of the
wife’s disability to contract can still be heard today. See, e.g., In re Estate of Shaffer, 2009
WL 606003 at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (reasoning that spouses may not contract with one
another to waive elective share rights during marriage, only before); Borelli v. Brusseau, 16
Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a husband’s promise to leave a bequest
to a wife in exchange for caring for him during his last illness could not be specifically
enforced for lack of consideration since the wife owes a duty to care for her husband as an
incident of marriage).
53. Schouler, supra note 1, at 125–28. The wife might be seen as “worse off at the
common law than infants; for the contracts of an infant are for the most part voidable only,
while those of married women are, with few exceptions, absolutely void.” Id. at 125–26.
“But the disabilities incident to these two conditions, arise on grounds distinctly different
from each other.” PEREGRINE BINGHAM, THE LAW OF INFANCY AND COVERTURE 181 (E. H.
Bennett, ed., 2nd ed. 1849). “The disabilities attached to infancy are designed as a
protection, for the inexperienced, against the fraudulent; those incident to coverture, are the
simple consequence of that sole authority which the law has recognized in the husband,
subject to judicial interference whenever he transgresses its proper limits.” Id. “Common
sense teaches that married women have sufficient discretion to act for themselves and stand
on a different footing from young children. . . .” SCHOULER, supra note 1, at 126. Even
these nineteenth century conservative male commentators seemed somewhat uncomfortable
with laws which generally treated women as infants.
54. BLACKSTONE I, supra note 46, at *430. “If the wife be indebted before marriage, the
husband is bound afterwards to pay the debt; for he has adopted her and her circumstances
together.” Id. at 430–31.
55. Id. at 432. The wife was permitted to join a deed executed by her husband “but when
she does so she is not bound by her covenants.” Schouler, supra note 1, at 127.
56. See WILLIAM HERBERT PAGE, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS Vol. I 653–57 (2003)
(hereinafter, PAGE Vol. I) (noting that a married woman could not make a testament of
personal property under ecclesiastical law and could not make a will of her lands under
England’s Wills Act); HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY & CARL ZOLLMANN, A TREATISE ON
THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY AND OTHER INTERESTS IN LAND 897 (1940) (stating
that “a married woman could not dispose of her legal interest in lands, nor could she so
dispose at common law of her personal property, since this belonged to the husband.”).
57. BLACKSTONE I, supra note 46, at *430. Because the wife is assumed to be “inferior
to him, and acting by his compulsion,” she “cannot by will devise lands to her husband,
unless under special circumstances; for at the time of making it she is supposed to be under
his coercion.” Id. at *432.
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as a rule of evidence neither could offer evidence for or against one another
in criminal matters, the wife could be indicted and punished separately.58
Dower rights provided a surviving widow with a meager source of
support if she survived her husband. Dower rights were typically limited to
a one-third share in a life estate to all freehold land that the husband owned
during their married life.59 Curtsey, the analogous estate for a surviving
husband, applied to all of the wife’s lands of inheritance, not just onethird.60 The origin of dower lies with the Saxon invaders of England from
what is today Germany, later overlaid with Norman regulations, and was
designed “for the sustenance of the widow.”61
Writing about one hundred years after Blackstone, American lawyerhistorian James Schouler spoke of the Married Women’s Acts produced by
legislation in the nineteenth century as a “radical change” and a “wondrous
revolution” that aimed “to secure to the wife the independent control of her
own property, and the right to contract, sue, and be sued, without her
husband, under reasonable limitations.”62 Maine was the first state that
authorized a deserted wife to sue, make contracts, and convey real estate as
if unmarried.63 Massachusetts, New Hampshire Vermont, Tennessee,
Kentucky and Michigan followed, and expanded rights to wives not
deserted by their husbands.64 Women became able to dispose of property
by will.65 Married women’s separate property was exempted from liability
for their husband’s debts.66 These legislative reforms brought married
women “nearer to the plane of manhood, and advance[d] her condition
from obedient wife to something like co-equal marriage partner.”67 And
58. But see BLACKSTONE I, supra note 46, at 432 (noting that “in some felonies, and other
inferior crimes, committed by her, through constraint of her husband, the law excuses her”).
59. LEE HOLCOMBE, WIVES, AND PROPERTY REFORM OF THE MARRIED WOMEN’S
PROPERTY LAW IN NINETEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 21 (1983). Dower originated in the
thirteenth century. Id. It was abolished in England by the Dower Act of 1833. Id. at 22.
60. RALEIGH COLSTON MINOR & JOHN WURTS, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 201–03
(1909). Curtsey is restricted to estates of inheritance while dower “is permitted in estate of
inheritance whereof the husband is seised in law as well as in fact.” Id. at 201. Curtsey,
moreover, is limited to circumstances where issue are born of the marriage while dower
does not require “that there should be any issue born of the marriage.” Id.
61. COLSTON, ET AL., supra note 60, at 203.
62. SCHOULER, supra note 1, at 251. Schouler was at times lukewarm about this legal
reform, predicting “that it will weaken the ties of marriage by forcing both sexes into an
unnatural antagonism, teaching them to be independent of one another and to earn their own
living apart. . . .” Id. at 11.
63. Id. at 251.
64. Id. The State of Virginia was “the last to yield.” Id. at 254. Georgia did not permit
married women to “‘own’ their own wages” until 1943. Kathleen M. O’Connor, Marital
Property Reform in Massachusetts: A Choice for the New Millenium, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV.
261, 293 (1999).
65. SCHOULER, supra note 1, at 252.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 230. Schouler could be just as patriotic about the state of marital property
rights in the nineteenth century as Blackstone had been in the previous one. See id.
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thus did coverture seemingly “fade out of our jurisprudence” over the span
of several decades.68
The Married Women’s Acts related chiefly to property and contract
rights.69 The primary change enacted by the legislation was recognition of
the wife’s separate property rights.70 The married woman lost “the strange
position of being without an existence, one whose identity is suspended or
sunk in the status of her husband; she becomes a distinct person, with her
own property rights and liabilities.”71 A married woman who kept property
separate from that of her husband was entitled to use, enjoy, convey and
dispose of that property as her own.72 Some states initially required a
wife’s separate property to be scheduled or inventoried in order to enjoy
separate property status.73
At roughly the same time, modernized intestacy and forced share rights
replaced dower and curtsey as a means to redefine marital property rights
upon death.74 In place of dower, the surviving widow was given a statutory
(proclaiming that the “love of justice and individual liberty which always characterized our
Saxon race, and the steadfast disposition of English and American courts both to administer
the written law impartially and to extend and adapt its provisions to the ever-changing wants
of society” favored the end of coverture).
68. SCHOULER, supra note 1, at 230; Dean Lueck & Sharon Tennyson, Human Capital
Accumulation and the Expansion of Women’s Economic Rights, 55 J.L. & ECON. 839, 841
(2012). But for eight states, all states had enacted laws expanding married womens’
property rights between 1848 and 1920 and “[t]he effective demise of coverture in the
United States was thus realized in decades rather than in centuries. . . .” Id.
69. SCHOULER, supra note 1, at 231.
70. See id. at 233 (asserting that the Married Women’s Acts “impair[ed] the old doctrine
which treated the husband as absolute or temporary owner, controller, and manager of his
wife’s property and acquisitions, by virtue of the marriage, and create[d] in favor of the wife
that is commonly known in these days as her separate property”).
71. SCHOULER, supra note 1, at 234 (emphasis in original); but see O’Connor, supra note
64, at 292–93 (noting that the creation of separate property rights for married women in the
nineteenth century was “an important step in undermining the common law fiction of the
unity of the husband and wife in the person of the husband” but also a “small and uneven
step” on account of “the reality that the wife had little real opportunity to acquire property
by which she might exercise her rights under these new, albeit limited, statutes.”). See, e.g.,
Otto F. Stifel’s Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy, 201 S.W. 67, 70–71 (Mo. 1918) (reasoning that
the Married Women’s Property Acts did not destroy the unity of spouses because the
statutes were only meant to destroy the unity of unequals and to restore the unity of equals
in the context of property held as tenants by the entireties); Kunz v. Kurtz, 68 A. 450, 453
(Del. Ch. 1899) (strictly construing the Married Women’s Property Act). “It is a remedial
statute, and we construe it so as to suppress the mischief against which it was aimed, but not
as altering the common law any further than is necessary to remove that mischief.” Id.
72. SCHOULER, supra note 1, at 264 (cautioning that “[a] married woman, in order to
preserve her separate property, should keep it distinct from that of her husband”).
73. Id. at 268. The registry requirements served to protect creditors and purchasers given the
then-familiar principle that property in joint possession was presumably the husband’s. Id. at 269.
74. See generally, Joan R. Gunderson, Women and Inheritance in America: Virginia and
New York as a Case Study, 1700–1860, in INHERITANCE AND WEALTH IN AMERICA 91–118
(Robert K. Miller, Jr. & Stephen J. McNamee, eds., 1998) (examining surviving wills and
the evolution of gradual extinction of dower).
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share or an interest of which the survivor could not be deprived.75 Initially,
a surviving husband’s protections were less comprehensive.76 If the
deceased spouse had attempted to disinherit his surviving spouse by
bequeathing his estate to others, the surviving spouse was entitled to elect
against the will.77 This right of election, in the nature of a creditor claim,
was superior to other claims or heirs’ rights.78 In this circumstance, the
surviving spouse was known as a “forced heir.”79 Loopholes in the forcedshare protective statutes, such as the ability of the disinheriting spouse to
use nonprobate or lifetime transfers to avoid the survivor’s right of
election, were gradually closed.80 The survivor’s right to an elective share
could be waived only with prescribed written formalities and disclosures.81
The idea of marriage has changed over the last two hundred and fifty
years, evolving as the original protectionist attitudes towards women have
softened.82 The expansion of women’s rights, and married women’s rights
in particular, underscores the greater swell of societal recognition of
women as much individuals and persons as their male counterparts.83
Greater property rights and workplace opportunities for women have been
accompanied by increased property rights, including the ability to contract
and devise separately from a husband and the ability to possess and control
property free from a husband’s interference. Marriage continues to evolve
75. PAGE Vol. I, supra note 56, at 900.
76. E.g., Mindler v. Crocker, 18 So.2d 278, 281 (Ala. 1944) (recognizing rights of
surviving widows but not surviving widowers).
77. PAGE Vol. I, supra note 56, at 902.
78. E.g., Via v. Putnam, 656 So.2d 460, 465–66 (Fla. 1995).
79. PAGE Vol. I, supra note 56, at 902. The survivor would also be entitled to homestead
and family allowance claims against a decedent spouse’s estate. See Wigley v. Hambrick,
389 S.E.2d 763, 766 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (widow’s statutory right to one year’s support);
Pratt v. Pratt, 37 N.E. 435, 436 (Mass. 1894) (homestead rights).
80. PAGE Vol. I, supra note 56, at 902–05.
81. See e.g., Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act § 6 (2012) (requiring
agreements waiving rights such as the elective share to be in a signed writing); Uniform
Premarital and Marital Agreements Act § 9 (2012) (providing when marital agreements are
voidable for lack of disclosure or unconscionability). In some states, spousal abandonment
works to defeat an elective share claim. PAGE Vol. I, supra note 56, at 906.
82. On evolving perceptions of marriage, see Anne B. Brown, Note, The Evolving
Definition of Marriage, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 917 (1998); see also William C. Duncan,
Portrait of an Institution: How Recent Cases Distort Our Understanding of Marriage, 50
HOW. L.J. 95 (2006).
83. See WEITZMAN, supra note 15, at 54 (asserting that “social and legal stereotypes are
complexly interrelated and mutually reinforcing.”); Mary Ziegler, Framing Change: Cause
Lawyering, Constitutional Decisions, and Social Change, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 263, 272
(2010) (concluding that “[o]nly when public attitudes change noticeably can movements
effectively pressure the government to recognize the legitimacy of their claims.”); Donna J.
Sullivan, Gender Equality and Religious Freedom: Toward a Framework for Conflict
Resolution, N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 795, 854 (1992) (proclaiming that “[l]aw reform to
protect the human rights of women must be accompanied by educational measures to foster
social change, and economic and political initiatives to advance women’s status if it is to
have a significant impact on women’s de facto rights.”).
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today, with most attention devoted in recent years to recognition of samesex marriages. Greater evolution is certain to occur. Some have advocated
for abolishing marriage as a legal institution altogether.84 Others have
argued for a range of marriage categories to reflect the diversity of aims
and values for couples entering into a marriage.85 In addition to re-thinking
the impact of marriage on property rights, Congress, state legislatures, and
regulatory bodies in the next decades may experiment with de-linking
government benefit determinations from the status of marriage.86 But at
present, the status of marriage works a transformation in connection with
government benefits as dramatic as the spontaneous divestment of the
wife’s property described in Blackstone’s Commentaries.
B. THREE CASE STUDIES AS A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
1. Wanda and Hagar: The Spend Down and Estate Recovery
Wanda and Hagar87 both grew up in the same moderately sized town
but they never met until some forty-five years following high school
graduation. They struck up a conversation at a county fair one afternoon
and began to date. Within a year, they were married. Both had similar
backgrounds. Wanda was recently retired from a clerical position with the
local public school administration; Hagar was recently retired from a bulk
fuel oil delivery job he’d worked most of his adult life. Both were sixtythree years old.
Wanda was a widow with three daughters, whose husband passed away
three years before she met Hagar. Other than her personal property and a
late-model sedan, her wealth was limited to a savings account with a
balance of $300,000. Hagar was divorced just over a year when he met
Wanda. His divorce had dragged on until he agreed to a settlement, which
left him with just $100,000, an old pickup truck, and his tools. He, too,
rented an apartment that suited his needs. His two adult sons lived within
an hour’s drive.
84. Jessica Knouse, Using Postmodern Feminist Legal Theory to Interrupt the
Reinscription of Sex Stereotype Through the Institution of Marriage, 16 HASTINGS
WOMEN’S L.J. 159 (2006) (calling for the abolition of marriage).
85. See Adam Candeub & Mae Kuykendall, Modernizing Marriage, 44 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 735 (2011) (arguing for the modernization of archaic procedures used to authorize
marriage).
86. E.g., James L. Musselman, What’s Love Got to Do With it? A Proposal for
Evaluating the Status of Marriage by Narrowing its Definition, While Universally Extending
the Rights and Benefits Enjoyed by Married Couples, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 37
(2009) (proposing alternative marriage options of traditional marriage and covenant
marriage); Laura A. Rosenburry, Marital Status and Privilege, 16 GENDER RACE & JUST.
769 (2013) (questioning whether governments should extend privileges to marriage); Kerry
Adams, Marriage Fraud, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2012) (noting that marriage is employed in
the context of many public benefits as a means of testing eligibility for those benefits).
87. It bears emphasis here that Wanda and Hagar and the other individuals portrayed in
the next two case studies are not real people, nor based on real people, and are rather a
construction based on perceived scenarios in the author’s pre-academic law practice.
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After Wanda and Hagar tied the knot in a quiet ceremony, they began
their married life together and agreed that Hagar would move in with
Wanda. Wanda lived frugally, relying on her social security benefits and
modest pension for living expenses. Like many couples in their
circumstances, they did not comingle their wealth; Hagar kept his bank
account in his own name, and Wanda kept hers. His money was his and
hers was hers, they both agreed, though they shared equally in expenses
such as groceries, rent and monthly utility bills.
“Your stuff is yours, Wanda; mine is mine,” Hagar once told her
sweetly, and she agreed. Over time Wanda’s wealth remained intact, but
Hagar had a tendency to outspend his income and his savings was
gradually depleted to almost nothing.
Fifteen years passed. Then one spring morning Wanda called to Hagar,
who was tinkering with a birdhouse in the other room. When Hagar didn’t
answer, Wanda found him slumped over his workbench, unresponsive.
Hagar had suffered a stroke, which left him severely impaired. After a few
days’ hospitalization he was discharged and Wanda, now seventy-eight
years old, took on the role of caregiver. The strain on her was immense,
but she bore it without complaint.
Wanda had retained her savings of $300,000. Hagar’s savings were
gone, however, and he consumed his income on a monthly basis. Hagar’s
stroke had rattled Wanda, and she began to think seriously about her own
mortality. Downloading a simple will from the internet, she assembled a
document which left her estate to her three daughters. Wanda arranged for
witnesses and had the will notarized at her local bank one afternoon.
The will was consistent with Wand and Hagar’s prior agreement that
her property was hers and his was his. “Don’t leave me nothing of yours,”
Hagar had once told her as they watched a sunset at the nearby pond.
“Your savings are for your girls.” Hagar was a proud man and Wanda
loved him for it.
Before long, Wanda grew to accept that her husband would have to be
moved to a nursing home. A caseworker at the nursing home instructed her
to complete paperwork for Medicaid. At first, she insisted on listing only
Hagar’s limited assets, arguing that her savings had nothing to do with him.
But when the caseworker explained that Medicaid requires a “snapshot” of
all marital assets as of Hagar’s first day in the nursing home, Wanda
dutifully completed the paperwork.
A few weeks later, Wanda received a responsive letter from her local
Medicaid agency identifying a spend-down calculation of approximately
$120,000. The letter seemed to be saying that Medicaid benefits would be
withheld until her savings had been depleted to that level. A bill from the
nursing home arrived in the same day’s mail. Upset, Wanda called the
nursing home caseworker, who confirmed that she indeed would have to
pay for Hagar’s care until Medicaid eligibility was achieved.
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Just over two years went by, during which time Wanda’s savings
account balance dropped to $120,000.88 Hagar finally qualified for
Medicaid long-term care assistance, so she stopped writing the huge
monthly checks for his care and her account balance stabilized. She visited
Hagar every day, even as her own health began to deteriorate.
Another two years passed. Then, one night, Hagar passed away in his
sleep.89 Wanda was devastated, but also in a sense relieved. Within a few
weeks, she had begun to recover from the loss and make plans for her
twilight years. But before she could entertain those plans, she too passed
away. She was eighty-two years old.
After Wanda’s funeral, her grieving daughters located her will and
scheduled an appointment with an attorney to determine whether a probate
proceeding was required. A simple probate was commenced and the
daughters were shocked when the Medicaid Agency filed a claim in an
amount equal to Wanda’s estate of about $120,000.90 Their probate attorney
explained the concept of Medicaid’s “estate recovery” program and that there
was no way to avoid the claim. Certain administrative expenses were
allowed, but the remainder of Wanda’s estate was conveyed to the State in
partial satisfaction of Hagar’s Medicaid lien.
Wanda’s daughters were left with bitter feelings associated with their
mother’s passing. They were less upset by the fact that they received no
financial benefit from Wanda’s estate, and rather felt that she should not have
had to pay so dearly for the privilege of being married to Hagar. Perhaps, in
hindsight, they wondered if Mom would have better off simply “shacking
up” with Hagar. Hagar was a good companion for Wanda, at least before he
had his stroke. But wouldn’t he have been every bit as caring without formal
wedding vows and a certificate from the county? Marriage, it seemed to
them, only benefitted Hagar’s creditors and healthcare providers.
2. Wendy and Herbie: The Forced Forced Share
Our second case study involves another couple, Wendy and Herbie.91
Coincidentally, their history—and their financial data—precisely mirrors
that of Wanda and Hagar, right up until Hagar’s admission to a nursing
home. Before she could obtain care for Herbie following his stroke,

88. Wanda’s wealth loss of $180,000 (from $300,000 to $120,000) over twenty-eight
months occurred with a monthly “burn rate” of approximately $6,430. Long-term care costs
vary widely and the “burn rate” is ameliorated to the extent that current income from both
spouses can be applied to the monthly nursing home bill. Any Medicare contribution
towards the initial one hundred-day nursing home stay has been ignored.
89. Hagar’s separate assets are limited to $2,000 or less according to Medicaid rules and
his actual account balance at the time of his death is just $500. There are no estate
proceedings for Hagar’s estate and the $500 is consumed by expenses related to his death.
90. If Hagar received Medicaid benefits for two years and the Medicaid rate of payment
was $5,000/month, a lien of $120,000 would have accrued.
91. Wendy and Hagar are fictitious characters. See supra note 87.
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Wendy passed away from a heart attack—possibly brought on by the stress
and strain of trying to care for Herbie at home—just one month after
having made her will.
Following Wendy’s death, Herbie’s sons brought him to live with
them. They planned to rotate their dad between their households and care
for him as best they could, but they could see that nursing home care was
not far off. Herbie’s sons consulted with an attorney, who recommended a
guardianship. Soon the sons were appointed as their father’s co-guardians,
with the power to manage his meager income.
In the hallway of the courthouse following an abbreviated appointment
hearing, their attorney asked them what they knew about Wendy’s estate.
The sons knew nothing. The attorney pressed the issue, emphasizing that
the sons, as guardians, had a fiduciary obligation to pursue inheritance
rights for their father. The attorney also noted that failure to do so could
have negative consequences for their father’s eligibility for Medicaid
assistance, should the boys become unable to continue to care for their
father in their homes.
Shortly thereafter, with their attorney’s assistance, Herbie’s sons filed a
timely petition for an elective share with the probate court. Their state law
provided that Herbie was entitled to one-half of the combined net worth of
the couple, less any amounts passing to Herbie under Wendy’s will.
Because Herbie was essentially penniless and Wendy’s will left him
nothing, the elective share entitled Herbie to one-half of Wendy’s estate of
$300,000.92 Herbie received $150,000.93 Wendy’s daughters bitterly
divided the remaining $150,000 amongst themselves, angry not about the
depletion of their inheritance in itself, but about the irrational legal
mechanisms by which that inheritance had been eroded, against their
mother’s clearly articulated wishes.
Scarcely a few months later, Herbie suffered a second, fatal stroke.
Herbie passed away one year, to the day, after the death of his wife. Herbie
was intestate. His estate (comprised solely of the $150,000 recovery from
Wendy’s estate) passed to his two sons in equal shares.
3. Gail and Lucy: Imputed Gifts
Our third case study involves a lesbian couple, Gail and Lucy. Gail and
Lucy also married later in life, each with an adult son from prior relationships.
Gail brought $300,000 to the marriage, and Lucy had $100,000, all of it liquid.
They kept their accounts and financial affairs separate from one another. To
that end, they executed simple wills by which they each left their estate to their

92. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-203(a) (2014) (providing for a forced share right
of one half of the “augmented estate”).
93. Offsets for probate and funeral costs, administrative expenses and the like have been
ignored. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-203(b) (2014) (reducing the forced share right on
account of “an allocable portion of general administration expenses”).
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own children, and durable powers of attorney naming their respective sons as
their agents in the event of incapacity.
After they had been married nine years, their relationship soured. Gail,
anticipating a divorce, secretly gifted her entire $300,000 investment
account to her son Trey, leaving the couple with a marital net worth of just
$100,000, all of it Lucy’s.94 Because the couple maintained separate
financial spheres and did not discuss their personal financial details with
one another, Lucy was not aware of the dramatic decline in her spouse’s
wealth. Gail, despite the large gift, continued to maintain her contribution
to household expenses with her pension and social security income.
Two years passed and the couple somewhat reconciled. Then Lucy
was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease and was admitted to a local
nursing home. Working with a caseworker, Lucy’s son Axel completed the
required Medicaid paperwork.95 It was at this point that he and his mother
first discovered that Gail had made the large gift to Trey. Furious, Axel
contacted Gail’s son and demanded that he return the money. Trey refused,
and Gail declined to intervene.
With Axel acting as her agent, Lucy pursued a request for Medicaid
assistance. The Medicaid agency informed her that she was being assessed
a “penalty period” of more than three years on account of her spouse’s
gift.96 Axel dutifully began paying for his mother’s care from her own
savings, which began to erode at an alarming rate. Six months later, Lucy
died. Eventually, Axel’s sense of loss was replaced by a lingering sense of
the unfairness at the depletion in his mother’s limited savings on account of
her partner’s gift to Trey, a gift, in fact, that had likely been motivated out
of mistrust towards Lucy.
C. MEDICAID OVERVIEW
Long-term care costs represent perhaps the single most significant
potential cause of catastrophic wealth loss for older middle income
Americans.97 Few things strike fear in the hearts of older Americans like

94. The transfer in anticipation of divorce may have been recoverable by Gail if a divorce
was filed within the statute of limitations for fraudulent transfers (typically two years). See
Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887 (Utah App. 1999).
95. Lawfully married same-sex couples should be treated as spouses for purposes of
Medicaid in any state. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Serv., 682
F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2012) (“By combining the income of individuals in same-sex marriages,
Massachusetts’ Medicaid program is noncompliant with DOMA.”); U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. 2675 (overturning provisions of “DOMA,” the federal Defense of Marriage Act).
96. Using a “divestment penalty divisor” of $7,500/month, a gift of $300,000 would
generate a penalty period of forty months. See infra notes 142–46 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the calculation of the Medicaid penalty period associated with gifts.
97. See Rochelle Bobroff, Judicial Deference to Federal Government Erodes Medicaid
Protections for Elderly Spouses Impoverished by the High Costs of Nursing Home Care,
29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 159, 162 (2002) (stating that “[f]ew Americans can afford to
spend more than a short period of time in a nursing home.”); see generally id. at 161 (citing
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ongoing care costs destroying their financial security.98 The prospect of a
monthly bill from a nursing home for any significant period of time might be
more frightening than sickness or death for those without significant means.
To partially address these fears President Truman initiated policy
objectives aimed at solutions in the 1940s, which eventually culminated in
President Johnson’s Medicaid and Medicare amendments to the Social
Security Act in 1965.99 An elderly President Truman attended the signing
ceremony.100 Given the historical relatedness, the overlapping objectives,
and the phonetic similarities of Medicaid and Medicare, some degree of
confusion among nonlawyers and the public at large was sure to result
with regard to the coverage and eligibility distinctions between the
programs. However, the programs markedly differ in terms of structure,
implementation, funding, eligibility, and aim.101
JOSHUA M. WIENER ET AL., CATASTROPHIC COSTS OF LONG-TERM CARE FOR ELDERLY
AMERICANS, IN PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 196 (Joshua M. Wiener et al., eds., 1995)). The
fear of long-term care costs is often utilized to financially exploit the elderly. See, e.g., U.S.
v. Rumsavich, 313 F.3d 407, 412 (7th Cir. 2002) (describing acts of mail fraud where
defendant preyed on victims with a “presentation of pamphlets titled, ‘The Cruel Cost of
Long-Term Care,’ ‘Long-Term Health Care and Poverty: Price of Nursing Care Is Poverty,
Survey Says,’ and ‘A Retiree’s Biggest Poverty Trap: Nursing Homes.’”). Long-term care
costs may very well represent one of the gravest concerns for state budgets as well as
individual taxpayers. See Christopher Robertson, The Split Benefit: The Painless Way to
Put Skin Back in the Health Care Game, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 922 (2013) (“Last year,
Medicaid spending was estimated to account for nearly a quarter of total state spending—
the largest portion of their budgets—and it’s getting only more expensive.”) (quoting
Ezekiel J. Emanuel, What We Give Up for Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2012),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/what-we-give-up-for-health-care/).
98. Roger A. McEowen & Neil E. Hart, Estate Planning for the Elderly and Disabled:
Organizing the Estate to Qualify for Federal Medical Extended Care Assistance, 34 SOC.
SEC. REP. SERV. 815, 815 (1991) (“Perhaps the greatest fear of elderly Americans is the fear
of becoming impoverished as a result of paying for their health care needs.”).
99. 79 Stat. 1432, Public Law 89–97; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq. Medicaid was enacted as
Title XIX to the Social Security Act (and is sometimes referred to as “Title 19”). Id.
Initially, Medicaid was “almost an afterthought” to Medicare. Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth
Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging Into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and
Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 15
(2013) (citing ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A
CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID 47–51 (1974)) (describing Medicaid as “ill-designed” compared
to Medicare). “The location of the execution of the Medicare and Medicaid Acts was in
deference to a speech regarding the need for Medicare and Medicaid made by Truman 20
years earlier and his role toward bringing these two great pieces of legislation to fruition.”
51 TEX. PRAC., Elder Law § 1:1 (2014–2015 ed.).
100. On July 30, 1965, President Johnson signed the bill, in Independence, Missouri where
President Truman lived. Molly Dear Abshire, H. Clyde Farrell, Patricia Flora Sitchler &
Wesley E. Wright, 51 TEX. PRAC., Elder Law § 1:1 (2013–2014 ed.). Johnson credited
Truman with “planting the seeds of compassion and duty which have today flowered into
care for the sick and serenity for the fearful.” Rebecca H. Hiers, Leadership from the Heart:
One Tribe’s Example, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 541, 543 (2010–2011).
101. See Meredith A. Devlin, Note, When Policies Collide: Citizenship Documentation
Requirements and Barriers to Obtaining Photo Identification—The New Medicaid
Citizenship Requirement as a Case Illustration, 41 IND. L. REV. 451, 452 (2008) (noting that
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Medicare is primarily health insurance for Americans age 65 and
Eligible beneficiaries are responsible for co-pays and
older.102
deductibles.103 Four different components comprise Medicare: Medicare A
(hospital insurance),104 Medicare B (supplemental medical insurance),105
Medicare C or “Medicare Advantage” (a managed care option),106 and
Medicare D (the prescription drug benefit).107 Medigap “wraparound
insurance,” the Medicare Savings Program, and Extra Help programs further
supplement the availability of benefits.108 The United States Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), through its Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (or CMS), is responsible for administering the program,
which is “exclusively federal.”109 Except in limited circumstances, Medicare
benefits do not extend to long-term care costs.110
Medicaid, on the other hand, does cover long-term custodial care
costs.111 In fact, Medicaid is the primary payor of nursing home care in the
Medicare is often confused with Medicaid); see also Merle Lenihan & Laura D. Hermer, On
the Uneasy Relationship Between Medicaid and Charity Care, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL’Y 165, 172–73 (observing that Congress labeled patients “beneficiaries” under
Medicare but “recipients” under Medicaid).
102. See Harris, supra note 21; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 et seq. (2012); 42 C.F.R. §§
405 et seq. (2013).
103. RALPH C. BRASHIER, MASTERING ELDER LAW 287 (Carolina Academic Press, 2010).
104. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c et seq. (2012). Medicare Parts A and B were part of the original
Medicare plan and the great majority of individuals choose coverage under Parts A and B
rather than the alternative Part C. BRASHIER, supra note 103, at 286. Part A Medicare
covers inpatient hospital care along with hospice care and, in limited circumstances, certain
in-home health care services and skilled nursing facility (SNF) care. Id. Part A is financed
through the FICA tax. Id. at 288.
105. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395j et seq. (2012). Medicare Part B covers doctor’s services,
outpatient care, services furnished by rural health clinics and ambulatory surgical centers,
ambulance charges, diagnostic tests and, in limited circumstances, certain preventative care.
BRASHIER, supra note 103, at 286, 302. Part B is financed through insurance premiums and
federal contributions. BRASHIER, supra note 103, at 303.
106. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-21 et seq. (2012). The Medicare Advantage plans described in
Medicare Part C’s “Medicare + Choice” Program are privately managed, require approval
by Medicare, and provide coverage under parts A and B. BRASHIER, supra note 103, at 286.
Thus, Medicare C is a closely regulated private insurance alternative to Medicare A and B.
A Medicare C plan may include extra benefits such as some drug coverage and routine
dental, vision, or wellness programs, but provider network limitations may offset these
benefits. Id. at 323.
107. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-101 et seq. (2012).
108. Id.
109. DAVID A. PRATT, SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE ANSWER BOOK 1–2 (Aspen
Publishers, 3rd ed. 2003).
110. Medicare Part A includes coverage for skilled nursing facility costs for up to one
hundred days. 42 U.S.C. § 1395d(a)(2) (2012). During the first twenty days, Medicare
covers the entire cost but thereafter a co-pay is required from the Medicare beneficiary. 42
U.S.C. §§ 1395d(a)(2), 1395e(a)(3) (2012).
111. Initially, Medicaid did not cover payments to nursing homes. Marc Gregory Cain,
Comment, The Effects of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act on Medicaid: Will
Seniors Have More Long-Term Care Options and an Easier Application Process?, 4 EST.
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United States.112 But Medicaid is emphatically the “payor of last resort.”113
Unlike Medicare, Medicaid is a means-tested program. The availability of
Medicaid benefits is restricted to the financially needy and the
impoverished.114
States may voluntarily elect to participate in Medicaid, and every state
has done so.115 Medicaid is jointly funded by federal and state governments,
and is jointly administered as a federal-state partnership program.116
Coverage and eligibility requirements vary significantly from state to state.117
Even the name of the program varies: For example the state program is
called Medi-Cal in California, MassHealth in Massachusetts, ForwardHealth
in Wisconsin, and Sooner Care in Oklahoma.118
The reasons for the high degree of variability in state-specific
Medicaid programs are fourfold: First, some federal Medicaid regulations
expressly delegate options as to how states administer the program.119
Second, states can apply for waivers from certain federal requirements.120
Third, states differ in their interpretations of federal Medicaid rules which
are often, on account of poor draftsmanship or otherwise, ripe for

PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 127, 130 (2011). Later, the Boren Amendment required
states to include long term care coverage under Medicaid. Id.
112. See BRASHIER, supra 103, at 346 (noting that ‘[i]n recent years, Medicaid has paid for
nearly half of all nursing home care in the United States.”).
113. James Square Nursing Home, Inc. v. Wing, 894 F.Supp. 682, 687 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
114. See Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154, 147 (1986) (noting that Medicaid “is designed to
provide medical assistance to persons whose income and resources are insufficient to meet
the costs of necessary care and services.”).
115. Huberfeld et al., supra note 99, at 15.
116. West Virginia Dep’t of Health and Human Res. v. Sibelius, 649 F.3d 217, 218
(4th Cir. 2011).
117. To locate the website of a specific state Medicaid program, see http://www.nasmd.org
/links/state_medicaid_links.asp.
118. NINA A. KOHN, ELDER LAW: PRACTICE, POLICY, AND PROBLEMS 277 (2014). In
Arizona, Medicaid is called the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System; in Kansas,
Medicaid is called the Kansas Medical Assistance Program; in Maine, it is MaineCare; in
Minnesota it is Medical Assistance; in Oregon, it is the Oregon Health Plan; in
Pennsylvania, it is Medical Assistance; and in Tennessee, it is TennCare. Id. In most states,
Medicaid at the state level is simply referred to as Medicaid.
119. E.g., Seatoma Convalescent Ctr. v. Dept. of Soc. and Health Serv. 919 P.2d 602, 605
(Wash. App. 1996) (noting that under Medicaid, “the federal government delegates
authority to the states to administer Medicaid and to devise their own reimbursement
systems, provided the systems comply with certain federal guidelines.”); see also E.B. v.
Div. of Med. Assistance and Health Serv., 67 A.3d 671, 676 (N.J. Ct. App. 2013) (noting
that the state Medicaid agencies have “broad authority to administer the State Medicaid
programs and plans, to ensure that those plans ‘provide such safeguards as may be necessary
to assure that eligibility for care and services under the plan will be determined, and such
care and services will be provided, in a manner consistent with simplicity of administration
and the best interests of the recipients.’”) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19)).
120. E.g., Hyde v. Dept. of Mental Health, 200 S.W.3d 73 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (involving
a Medicaid waiver program for in-home healthcare services).
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divergent readings.121 And fourth, although the doctrine of preemption
bars states from restricting Medicaid eligibility or narrowing coverage from
federal parameters, many state restrictions of Medicaid simply go
unchallenged, especially in view of the fact that Medicaid recipients are, by
definition, lacking in financial resources and therefore often without the
means to mount a legal preemption challenge to a given state Medicaid
rule.122
Given the central importance of Medicaid benefits for individuals
requiring long-term care, the degree of nonuniformity, ambiguity, and
opaqueness is astonishing.123 A program of last resort for impoverished
Americans facing nursing home care should not consist of indecipherable
rules with uncertain outcomes and interpretations. Frustrated judges
embarking on a reading of Medicaid rules have described them as
“Byzantine” and “an aggravated assault on the English language.”124
Moreover, most Medicaid issues require a nuanced reading of at least two
sets of often unmatched rules, both federal and state, along with
implementing regulations (both federal and state), the Medicaid Manual,
case law, and holdings from one state which may not carry weight in a
neighboring state.125 Relevant authority can be contained in agency
121. E.g., Hickey v. Waldman, 28 Mass.L.Rptr. 391, at *6 n.11 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2011)
(observing that “the question of whether naturopathic, homeopathic, and other treatment . . .
are reimbursable by a Medicaid-funded program” is a judgment “that the Medicaid Act
commits to the states, which have taken divergent paths.”).
122. E.g., Martin ex rel. Hoff v. City of Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1, 27 (Minn. 2002)
(holding that a state medical assistance subrogation statute was preempted by federal
Medicaid law).
123. See Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., Office of Assistant Sec’y for Policy &
Evaluation, Medicaid Estate Recovery 1 (2005), available at http://1.usa.gov/17b5xoV
(noting that Medicaid “pays nearly half of the total amount spent on nursing homes”).
124. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion authored by Judge D. Brooks
Smith, stated:
The Supreme Court has noted, echoing Judge Friendly, that Medicaid’s
“Byzantine construction . . . makes the Act ‘almost unintelligible to the
uninitiated.’” The District Court, in Friedman, which the Supreme Court
quoted, was even more direct: “The Medicaid statute . . . is an aggravated
assault on the English language, resistant to attempts to understand it.”
Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 331 n.1 (3rd Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted). See
also Yel Fig Rehabilitation Ass’n of Virginia, Inc. v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444, 1450 (4th
Cir. 1994) cert. den., 516 U.S. 811 (1995) (superseded by statute in other respects as noted
in Stohler v. Menke, 998 F.Supp. 836, 838–39 (E.D. Tenn. 1997)) (“There can be no doubt
but that the statutes and provisions in question, involving the financing of Medicare and
Medicaid, are among the most completely impenetrable texts within human experience.
Indeed, one approaches them at the level of specificity herein demanded with dread, for not
only are they dense reading of the most tortuous kind, but Congress also revisits the area
frequently, generously cutting and pruning in the process and making any solid grasp of the
matters addressed merely a passing phase.”).
125. See, e.g., Hobbs ex rel. Hobbs v. Zenderman, 579 F.3d 1171, 1186 (10th Cir. 2012)
(relying on the State Medicaid Manual to construe the Medicaid eligibility impact of an
interest in a trust).

300

HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 26:2

transmittals.126 Cross-referencing Social Security rules and regulations may
also be required.127 Despite the efforts of organizations like the National
Academy of Elder Law Attorneys (NAELA) and state bar elder law
committees, the number of attorneys truly versed and capable in their state’s
Medicaid law is relatively few.128 Medicaid applicants or recipients face a
dauntingly complex and often adversarial system, with qualified legal
advocacy and assistance often a rarity.129
Medicaid is a broad-based program whose recipients include children
and young parents, but for purposes of this article, attention is directed to
the long-term care benefits. There are two basic tests for Medicaid
eligibility: the “categorically needy” and the “medically needy” tests.130
Two subsets of categorically needy exist depending on the state in
question: SSI states and 209(b) states.131 In an “SSI state,” an individual is
eligible under the categorically needy test as long as he or she is eligible for
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), a means-tested benefit administered
by the Social Security Administration.132 Most states are SSI states, and in
most SSI states no separate application for Medicaid is required since
eligibility automatically follows SSI eligibility.133 Conversely, in a 209(b)
state eligibility requirements may be more stringent than SSI standards.134
126. CMS program transmittals are available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/home/regs
guidance.asp.
127. See, e.g., Ramey v. Reinertson, 268 F.3d 955, 964 (10th Cir. 2001) (relying on the
Social Security Program Operations Manual System, or “POMS” to assess a trust interest
for Medicaid eligibility).
128. Cf. Steven H. Stern, Case Study: Medicaid Crisis Planning for Spouses, 2 T.M.
COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 71, 71 (1998) (noting that “too few families take
appropriate steps to plan for” long term care issues). “The federal Medicaid statute is
extremely complex and contains many traps for the uninitiated planner.” McEowen & Hart,
supra note 98, at 862.
129. “States are often criticized for the level of difficulty and inconvenience involved in
the Medicaid application process.” Anna Wermuth, Comment, Kidcare and the Uninsured
Child: Options for an Illinois Health Insurance Plan, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 465, 469 (1998).
130. See Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154, 157 (1986) (explaining: “States participating in the
Medicaid program must provide coverage to the ‘categorically needy’ [and] may elect to
provide medical benefits to the ‘medically needy,’ that is, persons who meet the nonfinancial
eligibility requirements for cash assistance under AFDC or SSI, but whose income or
resources exceed the financial eligibility standards of those programs.”) (citations omitted).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i) (2012).
132. See generally, Sarah H. Bohr, Overview of Social Security Insurance Benefits and
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), 40 SOC. SEC. REP. SERV. 685, 696–704 (1993)
(providing an overview of the SSI program).
133. BRASHIER, supra note 103, at 352. “SSI states are not required to cover the medically
needy, but they may choose to do so.” Id. at 353.
134. Roger A. McGowan and Neil E. Harl, Estate Planning for the Elderly and Disabled:
Organizing the Estate to Qualify for Federal Medical Extended Care Assistance, 24 IND. L.
REV. 1379, 1386 (1991) (concluding that “the overall effect . . . in section 209(b) states, is to
reduce the number of Medicaid eligible persons and the amount of assistance paid to
qualified applicants.”). “The 209(b) states include Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma and
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Generally speaking, “medically needy” individuals are those who
cannot qualify as “categorically needy” on account of excess resources, yet
still have insufficient funds to pay for their medical care.135 The medically
needy category extends coverage on a more generous basis than the
categorically needy category, and states are barred from using any
methodology more restrictive than that used in the SSI program for aged
individuals.136 Two subsets of medically needy tests exist. In some states,
an individual is eligible under the medically needy Medicaid test by
meeting the same income and resource requirements of the categorically
needy after taking account of qualified out-of-pocket health care
expenses.137 Thus, certain out-of-pocket health care costs are deductible in
order to meet the income and resource requirements. In other states, outof-pocket health care costs are not deductible, but monthly income limits
are typically increased to 300 percent of the SSI level.138
In any case, the thresholds of countable Medicaid assets are $2,000
for a single person and $3,000 for a married couple.139 The amounts are
not indexed for inflation.
Certain assets are “exempt” or noncountable:140 One transportation vehicle;141 certain burial funds;142
Virginia.” BRASHIER, supra note 103, at 352. A 209(b) state must provide coverage for the
medically needy. Id. at 353.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii) (2012); BRASHIER, supra note 103, at 347.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i) (2012).
137. 42 C.F.R. § 435.725 (2013).
138. See, e.g., 2014 SSI and Spousal Impoverishment Standards, MEDICAID.GOV (Jan. 1,
2014), http://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/by-topics/eligibility/
downloads/spousal-impoverishment-2014.pdf. See also, Kenneth Hubbard, The Medicaid
Cost Crisis: Are There Solutions to the Financial Problems Facing Middle-Class Americans
Who Require Long-Term Health Care?, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 627, 638 (1995) (explaining
that “if the income of an applicant is even one dollar higher than the limit set by the state,
that individual cannot receive Medicaid benefits regardless of the cost of his care.”).
A Miller trust exempts the individual’s income (including SSI and pension
income) from calculations of income and resources if the state is reimbursed
from the trust for Medicaid expenses. An individual could use this trust if
the individual’s income exceeds the income cap but is still lower than the
average cost of a nursing home in the region where the individual will
receive care. The individual assigns all nonexempt income to the trust, the
trust directly pays the nursing home the maximum allowable amount, and
Medicaid pays the nursing home the remainder of the bill.
Richard Stebbins, Jacob’s Ladder to a Higher Quality of Life: Special Needs Financial
Planning for Practitioners and Caregivers, 4 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 305, 317 (2012).
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(m)(1)(C) (2012) (incorporating the resource tests under the
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program at 42 U.S.C. § 1382b).
140. The terms “exempt” and “non-countable” may be used interchangeably in relevant
state Medicaid rules. See, e.g., 22 CAL. CODE REGS. 22, § 50418(a) (2015) (“Certain real
and personal property is exempt and shall not be included in determining eligibility”); 130
MASS. CODE REGS. 520.008 (2015) (“Noncountable assets are those assets exempt from
consideration when determining the value of assets.”).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(2)(A) (2012); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1218 (2013).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(2)(B) (2012). Excluded from resources are “the value of any
burial space or agreement (including any interest accumulated thereon) representing the
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personal effects and household goods;143 and very small life insurance
policies144 are exempt. A house up to a certain value may be exempt
depending on the applicable state rules and the circumstances of the
The
applicant,145 and nonmarketable assets are non-countable.146
remaining exempt resource categories are relatively few.147
In addition to satisfying the resource requirements for Medicaid
eligibility, applicants must also satisfy income requirements.148 Generally,
purchase of a burial space (subject to such limits as to size or value as the Commissioner of
Social Security may by regulation prescribe) held for the purpose of providing a place for
the burial of the individual, his spouse, or any other member of his immediate family.” Id.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(2)(A) (2012); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1216 (2013). “[I]tems that we
acquired or are held for their value or as an investment” such as “[g]ems, jewelry that is not
worn or held for family significance, or collectibles” are not excluded as personal effects.
20 C.F.R. § 416.1216(b)(2) (2013).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(a) (2012). A life insurance policy “shall be taken into account only
to the extent of its cash surrender value; except that if the total face value of all life insurance
policies on any person is $1,500 or less, no part of the value of any such policy shall be taken
into account.” Id.; see also Miller v. State Dep’t of Human Serv., 2001 WL 278001 at *4
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that four life insurance policies with face values ranging from
$2,500 to $6,000 were all non-countable resources where none had any cash surrender value).
Term policies are excluded assets since they have no cash value. See id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§
416.1230(a), 416.1230(b)(5)). Medicaid applicants have difficulty retaining term policies,
however, given the ongoing need to maintain the policy with premium payments.
145. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(1) (2012) (excluding from countable resources the value of
“the home (including the land that appertain thereto”); 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(f) (2012) (capping
the non-countable home equity at $500,000, with inflationary adjustments). The home is a
non-countable resource and the equity cap does not apply if a spouse is residing in the
home. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(f)(2)(A) (2012). For various states’ treatment of the home
exclusion rule, compare IDAHO ADMIN. CODE IDAPA 16.03.05.871.01(d) (2014) (providing
that the home loses its non-countable character if held in a revocable trust and “is excluded
again if removed from the trust.”); Stafford v. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 181 P.3d
456 (Idaho 2008) (construing this rule) with OHIO ADMIN. CODE OAC 5160:1-305.13(D)(1)–(2) (2015) (providing that the home loses its exempt treatment when the owner
has continuously lived in a nursing facility for thirteen months); N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.4(b)(1)(i)
(2014) (providing that the home loses its exempt character if the owner has been absent
from it for more than six months); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 366 subdiv. 2(a)(1)(i) (2014)
(excluding a “homestead which is essential and appropriate to the needs of the household”
without regards to occupancy of the home); see also Moffett v. Blum, 74 A.D.2d 625, 626
(N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (construing this rule and overturning a determination that funds
expended on the installation of essential services in a home in order to make it habitable
such as heating, plumbing, septic systems and a waterwell could be considered countable
resources as “not reasonable and humane”).
146. 20 C.F.R. § 418.3415 (2015).
147. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(3) (2012); 416 C.F.R. §§ 416.1220–1224 (2013)
(property essential to self-support such as tools, machinery, livestock or an unimproved lot
on which vegetables are grown for one’s own consumption); 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(5)
(2012) (an Alaskan Native’s shares of stock in a village corporation during the period in
which the stock is inalienable); 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(17) (2012) (payments for participating
in a clinical trial involving the testing of treatments for a rare disease).
148. Medicaid recipients must also be U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens. 42
U.S.C. § 1396b(v) (2012). In addition, an applicant must demonstrate residence of the state
in which they are applying for Medicaid benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b) (2012).
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SSI rules apply in the characterization and counting of income.149 Income
is defined as “anything you receive in cash or in kind that you can use to
meet your needs for food and shelter.”150 Income tax refunds, however, are
specifically designated as non-countable income.151 Payment received on
the sale or exchange of an asset is not considered income, but rather
“resources that have changed their form.”152 Most social service benefits
are non-countable income.153 Medicaid does consider the income of one
spouse to be the separate income of that spouse.154
After satisfying the income and resource requirements as of the date of
application, Medicaid applicants must also demonstrate that they did not
voluntarily impoverish themselves as a means to qualify.155 Thus,
Medicaid penalizes gifts or transfers for less than fair market value within
five years of an application—the five-year “look back.”156 An applicant is
required to truthfully report any gifts as part of the application itself.157 A
Medicaid application requires disclosure of gifts by both the applicant as
well as the applicant’s spouse.158 The penalty for a gift by either spouse is
149. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1100 et seq. (2013).
150. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1102 (2013).
151. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1103(d) (2013).
152. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1103(c) (2013). “If you sell your automobile, the money you receive
is not income; it is another form of a resource.” Id.
153. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1103(b) (2013).
154. See infra p. 310 for discussion regarding the separate treatment of spousal income.
155. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(A) (2012) (“[T]he State plan must provide that if an
institutionalized individual or the spouse of such an individual (or, at the option of a State, a
noninstitutionalized individual or the spouse of such an individual) disposes of assets or less
than fair market value on or after the look-back date specified in subparagraph (B)(i), the
individual is ineligible for medical assistance. . . .”).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(B)(i) (2012). The sixty-month look-back is made from the
date that the Medicaid applicant is both institutionalized and has applied for Medicaid
benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(B)(ii)(I) (2012). An “institutionalized individual” is
defined as a person who is (1) an inpatient in a nursing facility; (2) “an inpatient in a
medical institution and with respect to whom payment is made based on a level of care
provided in a nursing facility”; or (3) is eligible for SSI. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(3) (2012).
In the event of a noninstitutionalized Medicaid applicant, the 60-month look-back is
conducted from the date (1) that the individual has applied for Medicaid; or (2) that the
individual has disposed of assets or less than fair market value, whichever is later. 42
U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(B)(ii)(II) (2012).
157. See, e.g., E.B. v. Div. of Medical Assistance and Health Serv., 67 A.3d 671, 677 (N.J.
App. 2013) (explaining that “[i]ndividuals seeking Medicaid must submit an application to
their local County Welfare Agency (CWA) for review”) (internal footnote deleted).
158. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(A) (2012) (providing “that if an institutionalized
individual or the spouse of such an individual . . . disposes of assets for less than fair market
value on or before the look-back date specified in subparagraph (B)(i), the individual is
ineligible for medical assistance. . . .” (emphasis added); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(4)
(2013) (requiring, where the spouse of a Medicaid applicant has made a disqualifying
transfer, states “using a reasonable methodology (as specified by the Secretary), apportion
such period of ineligibility (or any portion of such period) among the individual and the
individual’s spouse if the spouse otherwise becomes eligible for medical assistance”).
By its terms, subsection (c)(4) only requires apportionment when both spouses are Medicaid
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a period of ineligibility for Medicaid benefits based on the size of the gift
(or the cumulative size of more than one reportable gift).159
The length of a penalty period for a gift within the five-year “look
back” period is derived from a formula linked to the average monthly cost
of long term care in a given state.160 The larger the gift is, the longer the
period of ineligibility. If the average cost of nursing home care is $7,000, a
gift of $7,000 within the look back period will result in a period of
Medicaid ineligibility of one month; a gift of $70,000 within the look back
period would trigger Medicaid ineligibility for a term of ten months.161
The penalty period incurred by a gift within the look back period
begins to run on the date the Medicaid applicant is otherwise eligible for
Medicaid benefits.162 In other words, the transfer penalty does not begin to
run until the applicant qualifies for Medicaid under both the income and
resource tests. This starting date for transfer penalty was enacted as part of
the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 2005; previously, the starting date was
the same date as the gift itself.163 Because the starting date for a transfer
penalty is now deferred, because of gifts within the five-year look-back
period an individual Medicaid applicant may find herself impoverished
(i.e., with less than $2,000 in countable resources) yet ineligible for nursing
home cost coverage through Medicaid for a significant period of time.164

eligible. See Matter of Woytisek v. Novello, 309 A.D.2d 869, 869 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)
(Slip Op.) (holding that the statute and state administrative rule “clearly contemplate that
before the penalty period may be apportioned between spouses, both spouses must be
eligible for Medicaid.”).
159. Compare McDonald v. Illinois Dept. Human Services, 952 N.E.2d 21, 783, 804 (Ill.
App. 2010) (affirming seventeen-month penalty period for a $125,000 gift) with Frerichs v.
State, 960 N.E.2d 603, 606 (Ill. App. 2011) (discussing a mere one-month penalty that
would be imposed in the event of a single $10,000 gift).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(E) (2012).
161. See, e.g., Evans ex rel. Durbin v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Serv., 2013 WL
6823089 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). There, a nursing home resident transferred $16,000 in assets
and was assessed a four-month period of Medicaid ineligibility. Id. at ¶ 7. The State
Medicaid Agency utilized a private payrate of $120/day (or $3,600/month) in effect at the
date of the application to calculate the period of ineligibility (as opposed to a $4,050 per
month rate in effect not at the time of the date of the agency’s decision). Id. at ¶ 8. The
court affirmed, holding that “the divisor is determined by the pay rate at the time of
application.” Id. at ¶ 30.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(D)(ii) (2012).
163. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–171, § 6044(a), 120 Stat. 4, 88-2 (2006);
see 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(D)(i) (2012) (preserving the commencement date for penalty periods
as of the date of the transfer when the transfer was made before February 8, 2006).
164. See Charles A. LeFebyre & Martin W. Siemer, Survey of Illinois Law: Elder Law, 32
S. ILL. U. L.J. 865, 869–70 (2008). The DRA thus eliminated the “half a loaf” planning
strategy whereby an individual would make a gift to intentionally trigger the imposition of a
penalty period, retaining sufficient assets so as to have spent down to Medicaid eligibility
levels at about the time the penalty period would run. Id. See also Gene V. Coffey et al.,
Analysis of Changes to Federal Medicaid Laws under the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005,
2 NAELA J. 189, 198 (2006).
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Medicaid rules cast a broad definition over the word “gift.” Gifts
include outright gifts, bargain sales, purchases of life estates and certain
types of annuities;165 transfers to individuals or to irrevocable trusts;166 and
qualified disclaimers, even though a qualified disclaimer is construed as a
non-gift for purposes of the federal gift tax.167 Gifts also include a
Medicaid applicant’s failure to avail him or herself of all available
resources.168 Thus, the failure to sue a third party can be treated as a gift, as
can the failure to timely file a petition for an elective share against a
decedent spouse’s estate.169 The broad definition of a gift comports with
the Medicaid program’s underlying objective of closing any perceived
loopholes that would permit individuals to voluntarily impoverish
themselves as a means to accelerate eligibility for Medicaid benefits.170
There are certain limited exceptions to the Medicaid “no gift” rule.
Transfers of assets to a disabled child in trust, or the transfer of one’s
personal residence to an adult child who has resided in the house and
provided care for at least two years do not trigger transfer penalties.171 A
transfer of one’s personal residence to a sibling who has resided in the
home for at least one year is permissible.172 Transfers to a spouse do not
result in Medicaid transfer penalties, but rarely advance Medicaid
eligibility on account of the way in which Medicaid considers marital
wealth as a joint enterprise regardless of title.173
165. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(F), (G), (I), (J) (2012).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(3)(B) (2012).
167. E.g., In re Molloy v. Bane, 214 A.D.2d 171, 177 (N.Y. 1995) (holding that Medicaid
recipient’s disclaimer of inheritance from daughter constitutes disqualifying transfer); cf. 26
U.S.C. § 2518 (2011) (outlining qualified disclaimers in the context of federal transfer taxes).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1) (2012).
169. See infra notes 198–99 and accompanying text for the interplay between the no gift rules
of Medicaid and the availability of an elective share claim against a decedent spouse’s estate.
170. See Landy v. Velez, 958 F.Supp. 2d 545, 552–53 (D.N.J. 2013) (outlining
Congressional attempts to “close that loophole” relative to trusts, promissory notes, or the
“crude and straightforward” method of “the transfer of an asset as a gift.”); Gillmore v. Illinois
Dept. of Human Serv., 843 N.E.2d 336, 349 (Ill. 2006) (discussing the “loophole” of
purchasing an annuity when not characterized as a gift).
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(iii) (2012) (allowing transfers of assets to a trust
established for a disabled child); 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(A)(iv) (2012) (allowing transfers of a
home to an adult child who resided in the home “at least two years immediately before the date
the individual becomes an institutionalized individual and who (as determined by the State)
provided care to such individual which permitted such individual to reside in the home rather
than in such an institution”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(iv) (2012) (allowing
transfers of assets to a trust for a disabled individual under the age of sixty-five years of age,
whether or not related to the transferor).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) (allowing the transfer of a home to a sibling
“who has an equity interest in such home and who was residing in such individual’s home for a
period of at least one year”).
173. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(c)(2)(A)(i), 1396p(c)(2)(B)(i), (ii) (2012); see also Hal Fliegelman
& Deborah C. Fliegelman, Giving the Guardians the Power to do Medicaid Planning, 32
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 361–62 (1997) (noting that “transferring assets from a spouse
living in, or about to be living in, a nursing home—the ‘institutionalized’ spouse—to the other
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Unless a gift or transfer for less than full value falls under a delineated
exception, the three sole means of avoiding a transfer penalty associated with
the gift are (1) under the rubric of “undue hardship,”174 (2) by establishing
that at the time of the gift the donor intended the gift exclusively for some
reason other than accelerating or establishing eligibility for Medicaid,175 or
(3) by proving that the transferor simply made a “bad bargain.”176 The
burden is on the applicant to rebut the presumption that all transfers were
made with Medicaid in mind, and the evidence must be “convincing.”177
This proves difficult or impossible for the great majority of Medicaid
applicants faced with a transfer penalty, since it is not uncommon for a donor
to have diminished capacity at the time Medicaid eligibility issues arise, and
be therefore unable to testify convincingly—if at all—to the reasons behind a
gift. An “undue hardship” showing will also avoid the imposition of a
transfer penalty but is notoriously difficult to establish.178 Gifted assets can
be returned to the applicant to cure or partially cure a transfer penalty,
assuming cooperation on the part of the donee.179
Medicaid requires a showing of impoverishment to establish eligibility.
When a married individual requires ongoing long-term care, the healthier
spouse may be capable of remaining noninstitutionalized (as a “community
spouse—the ‘community’ spouse—is not an effective strategy for achieving Medicaid
eligibility since “Medicaid considers all available, non-exempt assets of the couple-his, hers,
and theirs-in determining resource eligibility.”).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(D) (2012).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(C)(ii) (2012). The Medicaid applicant must show that “the assets
were transferred exclusively for a purpose other than to qualify for medical assistance. . . .” Id.
176. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(C)(i) (2012). The applicant must show that he or she
“intended to dispose of assets either at fair market value, or for some other valuable
consideration.” Id.
177. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1246(e) (2013). The transfer of an asset for less than fair value is
presumed to have been made for the purpose of establishing Medicaid eligibility. Id. “The
burden of rebutting the presumption . . . rests with the individual (or eligible spouse).” Id.
178. See A. Kimberly Dalton, Hardship Waivers After the Deficit Reduction Act of 2006,
185 ELDER LAW ADVISORY 1 (2006) (observing that “some states appear simply to have
ignored the federal mandate to develop policy and procedures for evaluating hardship” and
“that anecdotal evidence suggests that relatively few applications for hardship waivers are
made respecting asset transfer penalties and estate recovery, and that such waivers are
‘rarely granted.’”).
179. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(C)(iii) (2012). Some states permit “partial cures” of a
penalty period when some, but not all, of the transferred assets are returned. The federal
Medicaid statute, however, suggests that partial cures are impermissible, and that “all assets
transferred for less than fair market value” must be returned for the penalty period to be
waived. 42 U.S.C. 1396p(c)(2)(C)(iii) (2012) (emphasis added); accord, Tjaden ex rel.
Tjaden v. State, 2013 WL 6822752 ¶ 45 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (noting the parties’ agreement
that “federal law leaves it to individual states to decide whether to accept partial returns.”);
see, e.g., Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Executive Office of Health and Human Services
Office of Medicaid, MassHeath Eligibility Letter 174 (Feb. 15, 2008), available at
http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/docs/masshealth/el2008/el-174.txt (providing that “[i]n the case
of a partial cure, the MassHealth agency recalculates the period of ineligibility based on the
transferred amount remaining after deducting the cured portion”).
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spouse”) and live independently.180 But if Medicaid requires both spouses
to spend down to only $3,000 in countable resources, the community
spouse may be so financially devastated by care costs that she loses the
ability to maintain even a modest lifestyle. To protect the community
spouse from total impoverishment, Congress enacted the Medicare
Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (the “MCCA”).181 The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals concisely summarized the intent and operation of the
MCCA in Morris v. Oklahoma Department of Human Services:
Because spouses typically possess assets and income jointly and
bear financial responsibility for each other, Medicaid eligibility
determinations for married applicants have resisted simple
solutions.
Jointly held resources to which a spouse had
unrestricted assets were considered available to that spouse for
eligibility purposes, but assets solely held by the community
spouse were treated as unavailable to the institutionalized spouse.
This system produced many unintended consequences as many
community spouses were left destitute by the drain on the
couple’s assets necessary to qualify the institutionalized spouse
for Medicaid, whereas couples with ample means could qualify
for assistance when their assets were held solely in the
community spouse’s name.
By passing the MCCA, Congress intended to protect community
spouses from pauperization, while preventing financially secure
couples from obtaining Medicaid assistance. The current version
of the statute no longer looks to the nominal ownership of
resources or to any State laws relating to community property or
the division of marital property. Instead, after subtracting the
CSRA, Medicaid administrators must count all remaining
resources held by either the institutionalized spouse, community
spouse, or both as available to the institutionalized spouse.182
The MCCA introduced the concept of the CSRA. In a community
spouse/institutionalized spouse context, the MCAA allows the community
spouse to retain an amount (or “share”) known as the community spouse
resource allowance (“CSRA”).183 The CSRA is calculated and marital
180. An “institutionalized spouse” means an individual who is in a medical institution or
nursing facility and is likely to remain there at least 30 days; a “community spouse” means
the spouse of such an individual. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(h)(1), (2) (2012).
181. Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 303, 102 Stat. 683, 754–64, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396r-5 (2012).
182. Morris v. Oklahoma Dep’t of Human Serv., 685 F.3d 925, 928–29 (10th Cir. 2012)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
183. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(1)(A) (2012). The computation of the spousal share is
computed as of the beginning of the first continuous period of institutionalization of the
institutionalized spouse. Id. This date is known as the “snapshot date.” BRASHIER, supra
note 103, at 364.
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wealth is assessed on what is known as the “snapshot date”—the
institutionalized spouse’s first continuous day of institutionalization.184
Federal Medicaid law sets a minimum resource allowance ($23,448 in
2014), and a maximum ($117,240), in addition to the institutionalized
spouse’s ability to retain an additional $2,000.185 States may set their
resource level at the ceiling or the floor or somewhere in between.186
While some states have simply adopted the maximum figure as the
CSRA, most “permit the community spouse to own up to one-half of the
couple’s resources up to a maximum of $117,240 (in 2014).”187 Three
brief examples illustrate this approach:
Example 1. Initial countable marital net worth of $400,000. Divide
by 2. Because $200,000 exceeds the ceiling of $117,240, spend
down to $117,240 is required. (The institutionalized spouse may
also retain $2,000.) Thus, consumption (or “spend down”) of a
total of $280,760 is required before Medicaid eligibility is
achieved.
Example 2. Initial countable marital net worth of $200,000. Divide
by 2. Because $100,000 falls between the ceiling and floor, spend
down to $100,000 is required. (Again, the institutionalized spouse
may retain an additional $2,000). Thus, the couple must consume
$98,000 prior to Medicaid eligibility.
Example 3. Initial countable martial net worth of $20,000. Because
$20,000 is less than the floor of $23,448, eligibility is immediate.
Because the majority of community spouse Medicaid scenarios involve
a marital net worth of less than $234,480, it is common to hear the CRSA
calculations expressed in shorthand as requiring the couple to spend half
their initial wealth on care to achieve Medicaid eligibility.188 For some
couples, such as in the first example above, the spend down involves a loss
of more than one-half of the couple’s combined wealth. For others, the
spend down may be less than one-half. For the majority, however, the
spend down will be approximately one-half. For the sake of brevity, the
remainder of this article will utilize the shorthand CRSA description of
requiring a spend down of one-half of the net marital estate.

184. Thomas D. Begley, Jr. & Jo-Anne Herina Jeffreys, Medicaid Planning for Married
Couples, 17 NAELA Q. 19, 29 (Spring 2004).
185. LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & RICHARD L. KAPLAN, ELDER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 129 (6th
ed. 2014).
186. L. RUSH HUNT, PATRICIA DAY, & MICHAEL MCCAULEY, UNDERSTANDING ELDER LAW
189 (2002).
187. FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 185, at 129.
188. See United States Census Bureau, supra note 17 (indicating a median net worth
excluding home equity for married couples age 65 and older of $92,238).

Summer 2015]

MEDICAID AS COVERTURE

309

The MCCA provides that the community spouse’s income is
unavailable to the institutionalized spouse for purposes of assessing
Medicaid eligibility.189 Thus, except in a case where the community
spouse’s income is so great that it results in the accumulation of excess
resources, there is no limit on the level of the community spouse’s separate
income. The community spouse’s income is irrelevant for purposes of
Medicaid eligibility for their institutionalized spouse.
Moreover, the MCCA recognizes that the community spouse’s separate
income is typically not excessive, and may even be inadequate for their
basic needs if all of the institutionalized spouse’s income is diverted to care
costs. Thus, post-Medicaid eligibility, the community spouse may be
entitled to a monthly income allowance (or “MIA”) payable from the
income of the institutionalized spouse. The community spouse’s MIA is
computed by deducting her income from a minimum monthly maintenance
needs allowance (or “MMMNA”).190 If a court enters an order awarding
the community spouse a portion of the institutionalized spouse’s income
for her support, this ordered amount constitutes the community spouse’s
MIA.191 The MMMNA may also be increased at an administrative
hearing.192
D. MEDICAID AS CONTEMPORARY COVERTURE
With this background in mind, and recalling the case studies introduced
above, it becomes evident that the eligibility rules of Medicaid embody and
evoke the archaic doctrine of coverture. Medicaid ignores the separate
legal existence and property rights of each spouse as a means to limit
benefits to the truly needy.193 Granted, a public benefit such as Medicaid,
given its scale, necessitates a “one size fits all” approach to eligibility
determinations. As noted above, significant variation among states’
approaches to the finer points of Medicaid eligibility rules exist.194 Yet
189. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(b) (2012).
190. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d) (2012). The MMMNA is comprised of two separate amounts, a
basic allowance computed by reference to federal poverty guideline figures and an excess
shelter allowance (or ESA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r-5(d)(3)(A), 1396r-5(d)(4) (2012). The
poverty guideline figure is capped at $1,500 and indexed for inflation. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r5(d)(3)(C) (2012).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d)(5) (2012).
192. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(e)(2)(A) (2012). Additional income from the institutionalized
spouse may be awarded “due to exceptional circumstances resulting in significant financial
duress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(e)(2)(B) (2012).
193. E.g., Cherry by Cherry v. Magnant, 832 F.Supp. 1271, 1279 (S.D. Ind. 1993)
(asserting that states have legitimate interests in crafting their Medicaid programs to
recognize “the marital relationship for what it is, a relationship of interdependence wherein
it is neither unfair nor unrealistic to require one spouse to support the other, in particular to
help meet the obligation to pay for family medical bills.”).
194. See Laurence Lavin, AIDS, Medicaid, and Women, 5 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y
193, 198 (1988) (noting that “states set their own financial eligibility criteria and have
flexibility to design the benefit package, however, there is variation among states in

310

HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 26:2

there is no variation in Medicaid’s basic assumptions about the availability
of separate marital wealth to both spouses, the liability of both spouses for
either one’s Medicaid debt, and gift penalties imposed regardless of which
spouse made the gift.195 When a married woman is confronted by her
spouse’s need for long term care, the Medicaid eligibility rules in effect
suspend marital separateness, partaking of the Blackstonian values which
denied the legal existence of a married woman.
For many traditional couples in long-term marriages that see their
wealth in a partnership context, Medicaid’s treatment of spousal wealth
may very well be consistent with their views of treating assets and
liabilities as one.196 Some couples are even surprised to learn that the
separate liability of one spouse is generally not recoverable from the separate
assets of the other spouse, or that they lack inherent agency authority to bind
one another. Medicaid eligibility determinations may thus align with
traditional couples’ views.197 “[S]pouses typically possess assets and income
jointly and bear financial responsibility for each other,” noted the Supreme
Court in a 2002 Medicaid decision.198 But for couples who married later in
eligibility and services covered under their programs.”). “Assuming the federal [Medicaid]
requirements are met, states have ‘substantial discretion to choose the proper mix of
amount, scope, and duration limitations on coverage, as long as care and services are
provided in ‘the best interests of the recipients.” Planned Parenthood of Indiana, Inc. v.
Comm’r of Indiana State Dept. Health, 699 F.3d 962, 969 (7th Cir. 2012), quoting
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 303 (1985) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19))
(emphasis supplied); see also, e.g., Eleanor D. Kinney, Rule and Policy Making for the
Medicaid Program: A Challenge for Federalism, 15 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 857 (1990)
(observing: “Because states have great flexibility in structuring eligibility, benefits,
coverage, and payment policies, the Medicaid program is really 50 very different programs
serving different populations and providing different benefits.”).
195. See Frerichs v. State, 960 N.E.2d 603, 608 (Ill. App. 2011) (stating, “[t]he federal
statute imposes a penalty when an applicant or his or her spouse ‘disposes of assets for less
than fair market value’ within a certain period leading up to the applicant’s request of benefits”
and that “[t]his result is mandated on all states that participate in the Medicaid program.”),
quoting McDonald v. Illinois Dept. of Human Services, 952 N.E.2d 21, 27 (Ill. App. 2010)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(A) (emphasis in original)); State-by-state variation on finer
points regarding gifts still exists. See Marvin Rachlin, Do Implied Contract Principles or
Fraud Theories Support Medicaid Suits Against Community Spouses?, 73 N.Y. ST. B.J. 32, 36
(2001) (noting: “New York State has taken the position that transfers by a community spouse
after the institutional spouse has been on Medicaid in a nursing home for one month or longer
will not affect the eligibility of the institutional spouse.”).
196. See Lisa Mahle, A Purse of Her Own: The Case Against Joint Bank Accounts, 16
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 45, 47 (2007) (citing a comprehensive study which found “a large
majority of married Americans believe that married couples ‘should pool all their
property and financial assets.’”).
197. See Am. Law Inst., Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and
Recommendations § 4.12 cmt. 1 (2000) (asserting that “[a]fter many years of marriage,
spouses typically do not think of their separate-property assets as separate, even if they
would be so classified under the technical rules.”); Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan,
Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 113 (2004) (arguing that “spouses should
be expected to share the benefits and burdens of their life together.”).
198. Wisconsin Dep’t of Health & Family Serv. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 479 (2002).
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life, having previously fully established their separate identities, individual
resources, and personal preferences, joining in marriage often rests on a
shared vision of non-union when it comes to financial matters. As Hagar
once told his wife, “Your stuff is yours, Wanda; mine is mine.”199 Medicaid
makes no allowance for couples with this approach to married life.200
Medicaid’s views are rooted in the days of Blackstone.201
1. Medicaid’s Disregard of Separate Marital Property
Prior to 1988, “each spouse was treated as a separate household” for
Medicaid eligibility purposes, just as Wanda, Wendy, Gail and their spouses
intended.202 Now, however, the separation of wealth and intent of the
spouses is irrelevant. Title or control between spouses is similarly of no
weight. The MCCA specifically directs state Medicaid agencies to “ignore
‘State laws relating to community property or the division of marital
property.’”203 All marital assets, whether titled in the community spouse’s
name, the institutionalized spouse’s name, or jointly, are simply deemed
available resources for Medicaid eligibility purposes.204
To be sure, the MCCA was based on a liberalization of Medicaid
eligibility rules, and was motivated by the desire to protect community
spouses from pauperization.205 At the same time, the MCCA intended to
prevent financial secure couples from qualifying for Medicaid.206 Prior to
the MCCA, “couples with ample means could qualify for assistance when
their assets were held solely in the community spouse’s name.”207 After the
enactment of the MCCA, the community spouse’s permitted resource
allocation was reset at no more than half of the couple’s initial marital net
worth; the other half (presumably, the institutionalized spouse’s share of
199. See supra p. 292.
200. States, however, are beginning to make allowances for different views on marriage,
especially for older couples. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.60.030(6)(b) (2014)
(permitting domestic partnerships for elderly couples where at least one member of the
couple is over sixty-two years old); Courtney Thomas-Dusing, Note, The Marriage
Alternative: Civil Unions, Domestic Partnerships, or Designated Beneficiary Agreements,
17 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 161, 179–80 (2014) (assessing Washington’s domestic
partnership scheme for older couples).
201. To be fair, marriage has always offered little variation or customization to fit the
parties’ individual needs or objectives; most marital rules are not modifiable by the spouses.
Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals: From One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodern Marriage Law,
89 CALIF. L. REV. 1479, 1492 (2001) (noting, “the legal norms governing marriage are quite
limited.”). Perhaps “marriage will ultimately be reshaped into a more fluid and multifactored form, more responsive to the needs of an ever-more diverse population.” James
Herbie DiFonzo, Unbundling Marriage, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 31, 32 (2003).
202. Morris v. Okla. Dep’t of Human Serv., 685 F.3d 925, 928 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Johnson v. Guhl, 91 F.Supp.2d 754, 761 (D.N.J. 2000)).
203. Morris, 685 F.3d at 936 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(b)(2)).
204. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(2)(A)).
205. H.R. Rep. No. 100–105, pt. 2, at 65 (1987).
206. Id.
207. Wisconsin Dep’t of Health & Family Serv. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 480 (2002).
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the marital pie) must be spent down.208 Even in a situation where the
marital net worth is comprised entirely of the community spouse’s assets,
like the first two case studies involving Wanda and Wendy, and regardless
of the length of the marriage, the MCCA deems the spouse needing care to
own half. That half must be consumed—typically on their care—prior to
Medicaid eligibility, in what is referred to as the “spend down.”209 The
spend-down process encountered by Wanda might be more accurately
described as seeing her modest net worth in free fall.
Wanda’s case study illustrates how MCCA’s view of spousal wealth is
reminiscent of the fictional marital unity of coverture. The marital “pot” of
assets and liabilities is deemed a unified singularity regardless of source
and of title. The institutionalized spouse applying for Medicaid is
presumed to have full equitable and legal rights to half of the marital
wealth as of the first continuous day of institutionalization, and Medicaid
eligibility will be deferred until that half has been consumed by means of
care costs or living expenses. It matters not that the institutionalized
spouse had no marital wealth of their own; it matters not that the
community spouse has already spent half the marital wealth in caring for
the ill spouse at home before a nursing home placement became
unavoidable. Beginning on the “snapshot date,” half the marital wealth
will be vaporized prior to Medicaid eligibility being achieved. While it is
true that the total amount of protected wealth is greater under a CSRA
calculation than the single person countable asset threshold of just $2,000,
Wanda would not have had to lose any of her property to Hagar’s care
needs had they remained single.
2. Imputed Gifts
Recall Axel’s distress at learning of his mother’s wife’s gifts to her
son Trey. The imputed gift rule is a particularly harsh rule when
applied to situations in which one spouse was unaware of the other’s
gift.210 Lucy faced a substantial transfer penalty on account of Gail’s

208. Or approximately half. See supra text accompanying notes 187–88. The term “spend
down” is also used to describe the process by which some states allow deducting medical
expenses against income to reach Medicaid eligible income levels. E.g., J.B. v. Div. of
Medical Assistance and Health Serv., 2002 WL 1999002 at *2 (N.J. Adm. 2002)
(employing “spend down” to describe the “process whereby a person may apply incurred
medical expenses to offset income above the medical income level”) (citation omitted).
209. See Morris, 685 F.3d at 938. “Rather than applying the pre-MCCA system in which
the ownership of a couple’s resources depended upon the vagaries of nominal ownership
and state law, the relevant question is whether given resources are available to the applicant.
An institutionalized applicant need not spend down her spousal share; rather, the couple
must spend down any excess resources beyond the CSRA.” Id. (internal citation omitted)
(emphasis in original). “[R]esources held by either spouse are considered available to the
institutionalized spouse.” Id.
210. See, e.g., Lancashire Hall Nursing & Rehabilitation Ctr. v. Dep’t of Public Welfare,
995 A.2d 540 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010). In that case, Charles and Dora Sherr were married
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gift within the five-year look-back, and it would have been pointless to
argue that Lucy had no mens rea, no participation in, and no
foreknowledge of the gift. In fact, Gail’s intent when making the gift
was likely linked to fears of a pending divorce, and suffused with the
objective of hindering Lucy’s potential divorce rights to Gail’s property.
And yet Lucy ultimately bore the ineligibility penalty for Medicaid
assistance.
Medicaid’s treatment of spousal gifts is sound insofar as it applies
to traditional marital relationships. A gift represents a depletion of
spousal resources, which runs counter to the Medicaid precept of
reserving benefits for the truly needy and penalizing those who attempt
to qualify by intentionally impoverishing themselves within a certain
defined period prior to applying for benefits.211 Imputing gifts made by
one spouse to the Medicaid eligibility of the other spouse closes a
potential loophole in Medicaid planning. In closing this loophole,
Medicaid law invokes its recurring tendency to treat the spouses as one,
with consequences that resonate with particular tragedy for someone
like Lucy.212
3. Estate Recovery
Estate recovery in the Medicaid context is a relatively unique concept
in means-tested benefits.213 No one expects that they will be asked to repay

but estranged. Lancashire Hall, 995 A.2d at 541. Charles became “totally incapacitated”
and was placed in a nursing home. Id. Dora received an inheritance and purchased an
annuity, but the annuity did not comply with the specific Medicaid requirements governing
annuities and so it was treated as a gift. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(F) (2012). The
Medicaid agency assessed Charles a transfer penalty of 415 days. Lancashire, 995 A.2d at
541. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court affirmed, noting that Medicaid law requires
the Medicaid agency to “count the combined resources of the Sherrs regardless of whether
those resources were actually made available to [Charles] Sherr. . . .” Id. at 545.
211. See In re Molloy v. Bane, 214 A.2d 171, 174 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (“Underlying all
eligibility determinations is a basic premise that aid is to be furnished only to the truly needy
and the Legislature enjoys great discretion to exclude from aid programs those individuals
who have purposely created their own need”); Tannler v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Health and
Soc. Serv., 557 N.W.2d 434, 437 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (observing that “[t]he divestment
provisions of [the Medicaid] program are an attempt to prevent the government, and
therefore the taxpayers, from having to subsidize the medical care of individuals who are,
but for the divestment, able to pay the cost of their own care.”).
212. A gift by one spouse could have ineligibility consequences for both spouses. Had
Gail herself applied for Medicaid assistance within five years of her gift to Trey, she also
would have faced a transfer penalty. However, apportionment would have been available.
See supra note 158.
213. Estate recovery has been permissible since Medicaid’s inception but became
mandatory in 1993; only twelve states had enacted Medicaid estate recovery programs prior
to it becoming mandatory. Katie L. Summers, Comment, Medicaid Estate Recovery: To
Expand or Not to Expand, That is the Question, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 465, 468–69 (2013),
citing Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Office of Assistant Sec’y for Policy & Evaluation,
Medicaid Estate Recovery 2 (2005), available at http://1.usa.gov/17b5xoV.
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the Social Security or the Medicare program. But Medicaid does demand
repayment—even from a spouse who herself never received any Medicaid
benefits.214 After a Medicaid recipient dies, the state Medicaid agency is
typically entitled to recover the costs of Medicaid benefits from the deceased
recipient’s estate.215 Estate recovery must be deferred if the Medicaid
recipient leaves a surviving spouse.216 But at the death of the surviving
spouse, the Medicaid agency will pursue the assets of the spouse’s estate.217
We saw how Wanda herself never received benefits from the Medicaid
program; her estate was subject to the Medicaid agency’s lien on account of
the benefits it had provided to her spouse, Hagar.
With estate recovery, the Medicaid benefits received by one spouse are
recoverable from the nonrecipient spouse’s estate, even after the decedent
spouse “spends down” to reach CSRA levels.218 After spending some
$180,000 of her own savings on her husband’s care to finally reach Medicaid
eligibility, Wanda’s remaining property was subject to confiscation at her
death to repay the state for the period in which it paid for Hagar’s care.
Estate recovery against the community spouse who has already witnessed
their separate property significantly eroded in the spend-down process
demonstrates Medicaid’s assumptions about the separate existence and
independent liabilities of the spouses. That is, there is none.219 The
Medicaid lien recovery reaches both spouses’ estates even where only one
has incurred the debt.220 Liability, it could be said, is joint and several.

214. See Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 1, 2–8 (Ind. 1993) (outlining the
mutual spousal duty of support for medical creditors).
215. See Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 283 P.3d 785, 790 (Idaho 2012)
(authorizing estate recovery from a Medicaid recipient’s spouse’s estate); In re Estate of
Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 66–67 (Minn. 2000) (citing and analyzing cases which have decided
against allowing recovery from a Medicaid recipient’s spouse’s estate and those that have
allowed it and holding that federal law does permit states to recover from a recipient’s
spouse’s estate); see also, e.g., WEST’S ANN. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14009.5(b)(2)(A)
(directing the state Medicaid agency to “make a claim against the estate of the surviving
spouse, or against any recipient of property from the surviving spouse obtained by
distribution or survival, for either the amount paid for the medical assistance given to the
decedent or the value of any of the decedent’s property received by the surviving spouse
through distribution or survival, whichever is less.”).
216. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2) (2012). OBRA also bars estate recovery while a surviving
child is under 21 and during the lifetime of a surviving blind or permanently disabled child.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2)(A) (2012).
217. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1) (2012).
218. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(A)–(B) (2012) (allowing estate recovery against “all and
personal property and other assets included within the individual’s estate” as well as joint
tenancies and revocable living trusts).
219. Compare SCHOULER, supra note 1, at 9 (explaining under coverture how upon
entering a married state the woman “cannot earn for herself, nor, in general, contract, sue, or
be sued in her own right; and this, because she is not in legal contemplation a person.”).
220. Compare id. at 121 (noting that under coverture the husband became liable for all of
his wife’s premarital debts but that “if the obligation be not enforced in the lifetime of the
wife, the surviving husband retains her fortune (if any) in his hands, and cannot be charted
further with her debts either at law or in equity.”).
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The case study of Wanda and Hagar demonstrates estate recovery in
action. Although the MCCA’s community spouse resource allowance
calculations permit the community spouse to retain a certain basic level of
wealth in order to maintain an existence outside of institutional care, there
is no analogous protection at death. Wanda had already lost more than
one-half her property to her husband’s care needs before he attained
Medicaid eligibility, and the Medicaid lien that accumulated after that point
was such that her remaining property was subject to estate recovery at her
death. In the end, not just half of Wanda’s wealth—but all of her wealth—
was devoted to Hagar’s care costs. The separate legal existence of
Wanda’s property, her testamentary rights to dispose of her wealth at her
death, and her preferences gave way to the coverture of Medicaid’s spend
down and estate recovery mandates.
4. How Medicaid Forces the Forced Share
The case study of Herbie and Wendy illustrates how the Medicaid rules
can operate to force a surviving spouse who is—or may soon be—receiving
Medicaid benefits to take legal action against family members in order to
avail themselves of all available resources. The Medicaid definition of
“assets” includes “all income and resources of the individual and of the
individual’s spouse.”221 It also includes all income and resources “which
the individual or such individual’s spouse is entitled to but does not
receive” on account of the action, or inaction, of the individual, his spouse,
or an agent on their behalf.222 Thus, failing to pursue a legal right or cause
of action can be deemed a disqualifying transfer. This rule extends to the
failure to timely pursue an elective or forced share claim.223
Once again, Medicaid rules can contradict the expectations of many
nontraditional married couples who view each spouse’s property rights as
separate and distinct, who respect each other’s testamentary objectives, and
would never dream of seeking to overturn their spouse’s will. Yet due to
the availability of a forced-share right, a surviving spouse with Medicaid
eligibility as a concern must choose between making an elective share
claim and suffering the consequences of ineligibility for long-term care
benefits. By failing to file and pursue an elective-share right, a surviving
spouse would face a Medicaid ineligibility penalty as a “deemed gift.”224

221. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1) (2012).
222. Id.
223. Matter of Mattei, 647 N.Y.S.2d 415, 416 (N.Y. 1996).
224. See I.G. v. Dep’t of Human Serv., 900 A.2d 840, 844 (N.J. 2006); In re Molloy v.
Bane, 214 A.D.2d 171, 177 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Estate of Wyinegar, 711 A.2d 492, 495
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); Estate of Shipman, 832 N.W.2d 335, 338 n.3 (S.D. 2013); Tannler v.
Wisconsin Dept. of Health and Social Serv., 557 N.W.2d 434, 437–38 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996);
see also, e.g., N.J.A.C. § 10:71-4.10(b)(3)(ii) (terminating Medicaid eligibility when a
community spouse does not leave the surviving spouse an amount equal to or greater than
the elective share amount).
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As in the case study of Wendy and Herbie, the fiduciary obligations
imposed on conservators or other surrogate decision-makers may also
suggest that filing an elective share claim is not optional if a claim has any
potential for recovery. Fiduciaries are expected to follow both objective
and subjective standards when substituting their judgment for that of the
person for whom they are acting, especially when that person has
diminished capacity.225 The objective standard is an abstract “best
interests” standard.226 The subjective standard grants deference to the
impaired individual’s personal preferences, to the extent that those
preferences can be ascertained.227
Under the current version of the Uniform Probate Code, a conservator
may pursue a right to an elective share in the estate of the protected
person’s deceased spouse with express authorization from the court.228 In
granting (or declining to grant) the exercise of such a power, the court is
directed to “consider primarily the decision that the protected person would
have made, to the extent that the decision can be ascertained.”229 The court
must also consider the protected person’s financial needs, their life
expectancy, and also their “eligibility for governmental assistance” (e.g.,
Medicaid).230

225. Contrast UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-418(a) (“A conservator … is a fiduciary and shall
observe the standards of care applicable to a trustee.”) with UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-418(b)
(“A conservator may exercise authority only as necessitated by the limitations of the
protected person, and to the extent possible, shall encourage the person to participate in
decisions.”). “This section reflects the dual role of the conservator.” Uniform Probate Code
§ 5-418 cmt. “On the one hand, a conservator is a fiduciary charged with management of
another’s property.” Id. “On the other hand, a conservator, like a guardian, also owes
obligations directly to the protected person. . . .” Id. See Lawrence A. Frolik & Linda S.
Whitton, The UPC Substituted Judgment/Best Interest Standard for Guardian Decisions: A
Proposal for Reform, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 739, 758–59 (2012) (highlighting the
Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act which elevates subjective standards over objective best
interests); Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of
Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 16–55 (1990) (tracing the history of the “legal
fiction” of substituted judgment). The tension between these two opposing standards is
especially defined in connection with end-of-life decision making. See also Mark Strasser,
Incompetents and the Right to Die: In Search of Consistent Meaningful Standards, 83 KY.
L.J. 733 (1994–1995); Kristen L. Beebee, Comment, The Right to Die: Who Really Makes
the Decision?, 96 DICK. L. REV. 649 (1992).
226. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:28 (2011) (requiring an oath from a guardian of
the estate that confirms the guardian “will act in the best interests of my ward”); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-5-417(1) (“A conservator shall act as a fiduciary.”).
227. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-425(2) (2014) (permitting a conservator to make gifts
“as the protected person might have been expected to make”).
228. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-411(a)(6).
229. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-411(c). “The protected person’s personal values and
expressed desires, past and present, are to be considered when making decisions.” UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 5-411 cmt. “Carrying out the protected person’s intent or probable
intent is a major theme of this article [of the Uniform Probate Code].” Id.
230. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-411(c)(1), (3), (6).
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Conservators are charged with balancing a protected person’s
subjective preferences against what may be objectively best for them—with
a bias towards the subjective approach—when it comes to a decision like
claiming an elective share against a decedent spouse’s estate.231 But
Medicaid eligibility rules take no account of a Medicaid applicant or
recipient’s personal preferences. The ability to assert an elective share
right is tantamount to a countable resource in connection with determining
eligibility for Medicaid.232 Failing to timely exercise an elective share
claim can result in an imputed gift with a resulting penalty period of benefit
ineligibility. In this way, Medicaid forces a surviving spouse to act against
their deceased spouse’s will, ignoring either spouse’s intentions regarding
their testamentary choices over their separate estates.

III. CONCLUSION
Medicaid is, by definition, a program reserved for financially
impoverished individuals. Medicaid eligibility rules must, as a
consequence, delineate between those who are needy and those who are
not. Medicaid rules properly discourage individuals from intentionally
impoverishing themselves in order to qualify for a benefit reserved for
those who are truly in need. Long-term care costs are typically catastrophic
for average Americans. Few individuals would intentionally deplete their
net worth through transfers to other family members in order to qualify for
food stamps or subsidized housing, but many would—and do—shed assets
in order to qualify for Medicaid assistance with long term care costs.
Given the breadth of the Medicaid program, it is not feasible to develop
nuanced rules that take account of the true complexity and variability of
marital relationships. Accordingly, the one-size-fits-all approach of
Medicaid’s eligibility and estate recovery was framed out of both
efficiency and predictability. Creating rules that accounted for the length
of a marriage, the original source of wealth, or the underlying value
systems of the couple would be unworkable. All couples, therefore, are
treated the same and without regard to how assets are titled. The Medicaid
program is complex enough without attempting to accommodate
differences among couples.
Still, given the fact that the possibility of ongoing long term care costs
continues to represent the single most likely contributor to wealth erosion
for older individuals, and that Medicaid is the primary source of funding

231. “Even in the absence of a statute, the conservator should consider the protected
person’s probable wishes” with regards to the exercise of court-authorized powers like
making gifts. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-411 cmt.
232. See Transmittal Number 64, State Medicaid Manual § 3257B.3 (emphasizing that
“the term ‘assets an individual or spouse is entitled to’ includes assets to which the
individual is entitled or would be entitled if action had not been taken to avoid receiving the
assets”), cited in I.G. v. Dep’t of Human Serv., 900 A.2d 840, 844 (N.J. 2006).
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for these costs, Medicaid’s disregard of the separate assets of spouses and
their separate liabilities reinstates coverture in important and even
disturbing ways for couples who had hoped to live a shared life in
marriage, but with respect, autonomy, and separation with regards to
financial matters. Medicaid’s rejection of separate spousal property or
individualized consequences for gifts assumes a complete spousal unity.
Medicaid’s “joint and several liability” approach to estate recovery
similarly turns a blind eye to any suggestion that one spouse’s liability
could be treated as the liability of a separate person in a marital
relationship. Medicaid coverture thus imposes the status of feme covert on
both spouses, dialing back the framework for marital separateness two
hundred and fifty years.

